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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(h) (2002) and as per those rules applicable to appellate assignment. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. I 
Appellee's dismissal of her lawsuit obtained in open court is valid, enforceable and bars the 
further maintenance of Appellee's cause of action 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The above issue can be decided as a matter of law. Bernard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). Insofar as the Petitioner, on April 15, 2003, requested and obtained a dismissal of 
her case from the Trial Court, she is subsequently precluded from seeking judicial relief from that 
dismissal. See Merriam v. Merriamu 799 P.2d 1172, 1175-76 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Helman v. 
Paterson, 241 P.2d 910, 913 (Utah 1952). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
This issue was preserved in oral argument and in multiple motions filed before the District 
Court. (See T1199 at 4-60; see also, R487-598; R762-76; R840-42). 
ISSUE NO. II 
The replacement District Court Judge's subsequent sua sponte motion granting Appellee 
relief from her dismissal is legally untenable. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The above issue can be decided as a matter of law. Bernard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). Insofar as the Appellee, on April 15, 2003, requested and obtained a dismissal of 
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her case from the Trial Court, she is subsequently barred to complain of that error to obtain a 
favorable review. See Merriam v. Merriam. 799 P.2d 1172, 1175-76 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
This issue was preserved in oral argument and in multiple motions filed before the District 
Court. (See Tl 199 at pages 4-60; R487-598; R762-76; R840-42). 
ISSUE NO. Ill 
Appellee is barred from obtaining injunctive relief by the doctrine of unclean hands: Those 
that seek equity must do equity. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On review of the grant of summary judgment, the Appellate Court reviews the Trial Court's 
legal conclusions with no deference for correctness. See Arnold Indus. Inc. v. Love, 63 P.3d 721, 
724 (Utah 2002). That Appellee is before the Court with unclean hands can be established from an 
examination of the record. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
This issue was preserved in oral argument and in motions filed before the District Court and 
in numerous oral arguments. See, e.g., R59, 298-99; Tl 199 at 38-40. 
ISSUE NO. IV 
The District Court Judge's legal conclusion that Appellant waived her right to honor her 
deceased husband's wishes is incorrect as a matter of law. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Waiver is a legal conclusion that conjunctively requires an existing right, benefit, or 
advantage, a knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it. See Soter's, Inc. v. 
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Deseret Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n. 857 P.2d 935, 938-42 (Utah 1993). On appeal from summary 
judgment, this Court should give the District Court's legal conclusions no deference and, indeed, all 
inferences which may be drawn from the facts should be made in Appellant's favor. Pride Stables 
v. Homestead Golf Club. Inc.. 82 P.3d 198, 201 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
This issue was preserved in multiple motions and memoranda before the District Court. 
(R58-59;R819-20). 
ISSUE NO. V 
Both the common law and statutory law of Utah support Appellant, Mrs. Dozzo-Hughes' 
right to disinter and cremate her husband's remains according to his burial wishes. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This issue clearly calls for a legal conclusion and no deference need be given to the District 
Court's legal conclusion. Bernard v. Murphy. 882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct. App 1999). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
The issue was preserved, both in written and oral argument. (R57-58; R782-85; R813-17; 
T1199 at pp. 61-114). 
ISSUE NO. VI 
In entering summary judgment against Appellant, the District Court failed to accept 
Appellant's factual statements as true and to draw all inferences in her favor. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Insofar as this matter is taken on appeal from summary judgment, the Court of Appeals on 
review should consider all of the evidence which Appellant is able to present and every inference 
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fairly arising therefrom. See Abdulkadirv. Western Pac. R.R. Co.. 318 P.2d 339 (Utah 1957). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
This issue is implicitly preserved from summary judgment and in the filing of the Notice of 
Appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §58-9-602 (2002). See Addendum at A33. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 63. See Addendum at A35. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65(A). See Addendum at A37. 
Utah R. Jud. Admin.4-504 (2003) (replaced in substance by Rule 7, Utah R. Civ. P. (2004)). See 
Addendum at A41. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Curtis Hughes took his own life on February 27, 2002 in New Mexico. (R397). 
Approximately three weeks prior thereto, he had orally expressed to Appellant his desire to be 
cremated. (T1200at86: 6-10; 94:15-24). On the day ofhis death he left, in Appellee's constructive 
possession, a partially holographic instrument declaring his intent. (T1200 at 35; 16-18; 46:13-20; 
see also, R63,255 at Exhibit 3, R414, 656, Tl 195 at Exhibit 1; and Tl 196 at Exhibit 1; Addendum 
at Al). Appellant, who was grieving at the time, asked Appellee, her mother-in-law, whether her 
husband's note had requested cremation. Appellee was already worried about cremation. Appellee 
already had specifically conferenced with a mortician regarding avoiding cremation. At trial, 
Appellee said this conference occurred absent Appellee's knowledge of decedent's note's contents. 
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(T1200 at 48-51, 53, 55, 57, 58). After, Appellee's conference with the mortician, and Appellee's 
extended family continuously advised Appellant that no request for cremation had been made; 
Appellee strictly forbade anyone from reading the note to Appellant. (T1200 at 52: 16-18; 77:13-
20). Appellee was fearful that Appellant would see the note. (T1200 at 53: 24-54: 6). Under these 
circumstances, Curtis Hughes was buried in Utah on March 8,2002. (T1200 at 34:16-24; 36:10-11). 
During the late summer of 2002, however, Appellant, for the first time, read the written 
directive by which her husband requested cremation. In compliance with accepted Utah procedure, 
Appellant sought the disinterment of her husband's remains. (Tl 200 at 9-10). Appellee subsequently 
filed suit seeking to enjoin Appellant, ultimately naming Mr. Hughes' former wife, Marty Stroman, 
Washington County, and Southwest Utah Public Health Department. (Rl-4; 18-22). The 
governmental entities briefly appeared stating that neither Washington County nor the Southwest 
Utah Public Health Department had any vested health or governmental interest, whatsoever, in the 
case's outcome. (T1200 at 8-10). Indeed, the Southwest Utah Public Health Department was fully 
prepared to issue Appellant a disinterment permit. (T1200 at 9-10). 
The Trial Court, the Honorable James L. Shumate presiding, conducted an evidentiary 
hearing on December 16 and 17,2002. (T1200). Trial was thereafter continued until April 15,2003. 
(R100, 108). On April 14, 2003, at approximately 4:55 p.m., Appellee moved to disqualify Judge 
Shumate and allegedly mailed her motion to Appellant; it was never received nor was the supporting 
Affidavit or Memorandum. (R115, 121, 126, 129, 138-44). The following day, electronic review 
of the Court docket indicated the motion's filing, thus, Appellant, who had flown from New Mexico 
with her witnesses, spent the day at counsel's office. (R140^[8). Incongruously, Appellee appeared 
at the now unscheduled hearing with her attorney. (Tl 197; Rule 63, Utah R. Civ. P.). Seeking to 
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specifically take advantage of Appellant's absence, Appellee then withdrew her Motion to disqualify 
Judge Shumate, and engaged the Trial Court in a hearing. Therein, on two occasions, Appellee 
moved for a dismissal of her case. T1197 at 1-4; see also T1199 at 23:12-24). Judge Shumate 
dismissed the case and instructed Appellee to prepare an appropriate order. (Tl 197 at 4; R130). 
Within minutes thereafter, Appellant, through her counsel, discovered that an ex parte hearing had 
occurred. Viewing the minute entry, Appellant' s counsel spoke directly to Appellee's counsel at the 
courthouse on April 15, 2003 at about 3:10 p.m. and requested an opportunity to review the order 
of dismissal prior to its submission to Judge Shumate. (Rl 90-92; 140-44). On the morning of April 
16, 2003, Appellant's counsel telephoned Appellee's counsel again requesting review of the 
proposed order pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah R. Jud. Admin, (replaced in substance by Rule 7, Utah 
R. Civ. P. (2004)). Id 
Appellee, however, knowingly submitted an erroneous order to the Trial Court granting 
Appellee full injunctive relief. (R134; 397-402; Tl 197). Appellee hand delivered this order to the 
Judge on the morning of April 16, 2003; it was executed and filed at 11:41 a.m. the same day. 
(Rl 31). Indeed, fully executed exemplified copies were served simultaneously by Appellee on the 
St. George Sexton. (R131; 134). Appellant's counsel received a signed copy by mail on April 17, 
2003. No prior hand delivery to Appellant's counsel took place. (R261-87). 
Subsequent thereto, Appellant motioned to correct the erroneous order. (R194). Appellee, 
rather than conceding her fraud on the Court, chose rather to argue that the permanent injunction 
order comported with Judge Shumate's "real intent" and that she had appeared on April 15, 2003 
ready to "pursue and go on with the case". (T1199 at 22:12-13; 25:19-23; c f T l 199 at 12-23). As 
to Appellee's version of Judge Shumate's "real intent", Judge Shumate disagreed. (R397-402). 
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Appellee made no motion for judicial relief from the dismissal on any grounds. (Tl 199, R399). 
On April 23,2003, the Trial Court rescheduled a May 21,2003 hearing on Appellee's Motion 
to Recuse which motion Appellee had orally withdrawn eight days before. Two days prior to the 
scheduled hearing, on May 19, 2003, Judge Shumate ruled on Appellant's Rule 59(e) Motion 
seeking an order of dismissal. (R397-402; see also Addendum at A2-A7). Therein, Judge Shumate 
correctly recited that Appellee had withdrawn her Motion for Recusal and that he had granted 
Appellee's "oral motion to dismiss the case and the matter was dismissed". (See R398). The Trial 
Court also correctly noted that Appellee had attempted to play "hardball" to reach a favorable result, 
but that the outcome did not serve the Appellee based upon Appellee's attorney's "repeated failure 
to adequately perform his duty". Id The Trial Court thereafter noted that Appellee had generally 
failed to comply with both the Utah R.Civ P. and Utah R. Jud. Admin., which mandated reasonable 
service of an order on opposing counsel before submission to the Court. In reference to the 
substance of the April 16, 2003 Order allowing Appellee permanent injunctive relief, Judge 
Shumate characterized the same as "an erroneous order", and recognized Appellant's pending Rule 
59 Motion to Amend the Order to conform to the oral dismissal and Appellee's total failure to 
address any of Appellant's substantive arguments surrounding Appellant's Motion. (R399). 
Thereafter, however, the Trial Court incorrectly held that, once Appellee's recusal motion had been 
docketed, the Judge lacked jurisdiction to enter the dismissal and, thus, the proceedings were 
rendered "moot as a result of the filing". (R400). Thereafter, Judge Shumate recused himself. Id. 
After assignment to the Judge Beacham, Appellant sought judicial review of the Trial Court's 
May 19, 2003 ruling, asserting that, under limited circumstances, orders entered by a judge against 
whom a motion to recuse is filed, are merely voidable but not void and then voidable only at the 
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behest of the non-participating party. (R478, 487). Consequently, Appellant's motion for a 
conforming order was extant and compelled dismissal of the case. Judge Beacham correctly struck 
that portion of Judge Shumate's May 19, 2003 order indicating that the proceedings from and after 
April 15,2003 were moot. (T1199 at 43:19-25). Despite Judge Shumate's statement that the hearing 
of April 15, 2003 had a resulted in a dismissal of Appellee's case, however, Judge Beacham 
indicated that he did not have ESP and could not divine Judge Shumate's intent. (Tl 197; R398-99; 
T1199 at 34:23-25). While noting that Judges must trust attorneys to file correct orders, the 
replacement Judge, thereafter sua sponte moved to vacate the oral order to dismiss based on grounds 
of Appellee's counsel's mistake. (T1199 at 44). This action occurred absent any motion from 
Appellee and contrary to the Court's own recitation that the Petitioner "cannot complain about the 
results if her own attorney moves to dismiss her own case". (Tl 199 at 44:16-18). The District Court 
argued that his motion to vacate the oral order of dismissal involved higher constitutional principles 
which were illustrated or fomented in the judicial mind by a scene from the movie, 'The 
Untouchables", viewed by the Judge the night before the scheduled argument. (Tl 199 at 32-34). 
2. DISPOSITION AT THE DISTRICT COURT 
Judge Beacham then urged Appellant to seek summary judgment under Chapter 9 of Title 
5 8 of the Utah Code. Cross motions for summary judgment were filed, but the Court then found that 
this statute had no applicability due to the date of Curtis Hughes5 death. (R864-65). Thereafter, the 
Court found that the non-waiver of Appellant's rights to dispose o f her husband's remains, according 
to his wishes, was immaterial to the outcome of the case, contending oxymoronically that Appellant 
had not asserted that the note was a clear and unequivocal expression of Mr. Hughes' wishes. 
(R866-67). Thereafter, while indicating that the issue of waiver was immaterial, the Court 
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subsequently found that by allowing her husband's remains to be buried in Utah, Respondent 
"waived any right to choose another form of disposition". (R867). In so ruling, the Court focused 
on the mother-son relationship accepting Appellee's argument that Appellant had been separated 
from Mr. Hughes at the time of the latter's death. (R868; c£ T1195 at 40:21-25; T1200 at 65:9-11). 
Ultimately, the Court indicated that the decedent's wishes were contradictory and could not be 
determined with any certainty, and, due to his suicide were to be given lesser weight, globally 
entering summary judgment granting Appellee her injunctive relief. (R866 at n.5; R869 at c). 
Appellant then filed a Rule 60(b) Motion for the Court to reconsider its sua sponte reopening 
of Appellee's case. (R839). In rejecting Appellant's motion, the District Court, rather than noting 
that Judge Shumate had entered a written order, albeit an incorrect one, simply stated that, as no 
formal order of dismissal was ever entered, the subsequent Judge had the ability to change the 
generic judicial mind. (Rl 189-90). In so ruling, Judge Beacham cited a plethora of cases 
inapplicable to the factual situation. The Judge provided his own supportive case law, as Appellee 
provided none. (Rl002-03). 
3. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellant, Leslie Dozzo-Hughes, met the decedent, Curtis Hughes, while entertaining 
Mr. Hughes' daughter at a birthday party for Appellant's similarly aged daughter. (T1200 at 12:1-
11; 88:2-3; 89:15-24). Shortly thereafter, Appellant and Mr. Hughes began dating as they lived in 
the same neighborhood in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Id. They later married on March 18, 2001 
in New Mexico. (Id at 13:12; T1196 at 15)). Their marriage was conducted at Hofftnan Town 
West, a Christian Evangelical Church to which Curtis belonged, having separated himself from 
Appellee's LDS Faith many years before during a prior marriage to Marty Stroman. (T1200 at 8:23-
9 
9:4, 56:18-25). This same church had provided the newlyweds premarital couple's counseling. 
(T1200 at P.9). In Appellee's mind, however, the decedent remained LDS because his name had not 
been removed from the LDS records. (T1200 at 56:12-17) 
2. Neither Appellee nor Appellee's extended family attended the wedding. (Tl 196 at 
15: 24-16:12). Curtis Hughes chose not to invite his family to his wedding. The last time Appellee 
saw her son was when she met him at a little drive-in not far from Albuquerque to see her 
granddaughter. (Tl 195 at 10:16). During Appellant's marriage to Mr. Hughes, he stayed out late 
on three or four occasions. Appellant believed, over time, that another woman might be involved. 
(T1200 at 93:17-22). Mr. Hughes' siblings and Appellee were aware, however, that Mr. Hughes was 
concealing a serious gambling problem. (Tl 196 at 21:20-22:5,25:5-7,35:12-18). Three weeks prior 
to his passing, Appellant advised Mr. Hughes that he should not stay out all night as he was a 
married man. Believing later that decedent was romantically involved, Appellant changed the locks 
to the home on February 12, 2002. (T1200 at 93:17-22). That same night, decedent left Appellant 
a recorded message threatening suicide and requesting cremation with his ashes to be scattered by 
Paseo Bridge, a location where Mr. Hughes often picnicked with Appellant and his daughter. (T1200 
at 94:20-24, 103:1-12, 19-24). An hour after receiving the voice mail, decedent called Appellant 
and they spoke about their marital situation and counseling. (T1200 at 95:18-22). Appellant 
believed that the suicide threat was Mr. Hughes' cry for help. From February 13, 2002 through 
February 15, 2002, Appellant and Mr. Hughes remained apart. (T1200 at 109). On the evening of 
February 16, 2002 one of Appellant's children became ill and Mr. Hughes came home to help. 
(T1196 at 84-86). 
3. Thereafter, Appellant and decedent openly discussed their marriage and mutually 
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determined that they would begin marital counseling in the near future. Curtis remained at the home 
with Appellant from February 17, 2002 through February 27, 2002. Id. Appellee had no real 
knowledge where her son lived during this time. She had little contact with him. (T1200 at 59:9-11). 
On the evening of February 27, 2002, Curtis Hughes left the home, went to a motel in Albuquerque 
and poisoned himself, a method facilitated by Mr. Hughes' work with chemical agents. (T1200 at 
85:5-12). Before his passing, Mr. Hughes addressed two notes, one to his brother, Steven, and the 
other addressed to Appellee. (T1195 at 14:13-23; Exhibits 1 and 2 to T1195). Mr. Hughes 
telephonically advised his brother where to find the notes. (T1200 at 24:14-19). Steven then told 
Appellee of the note's existence. (Tl 195 at 50:2-8). It is uncontested by Appellee that the latter 
note, partially typed, bears the handwriting and signature of Curtis Hughes and that Mr. Hughes' 
request is not ambiguous. (T1200 at 24:8-13; 38:18-25; 104:20-25; T1195 at 27:15-17, 28:1-5; 
Addendum as Al). In reference to his wishes pertaining to the disposition of his body, Curtis 
Hughes stated as follows: 
I would like to be cremated ASAP and have my remains put in the Rio Grande at 
Paseo Bridge please. 
Addendum at Al; see also R63, 255 at Exhibit 3, R414, 656, T1195 at Exhibit 1; and T1196 at 
Exhibit 1) 
4. On February 28, 2002, Mr. Hughes' brother, Steven, contacted Appellant advising 
her of her husband's suicide the night before. (T1200 at 98:8-25). Steven then came to Appellant's 
house and advised her that Curtis had left two notes before he died. IcL Upon Appellant' s specific 
inquiry regarding decedent's burial wishes, Steven told Appellant that the burial note was directed 
to Appellee and that that matter was in Appellee's hands. (T1200 at 96, 97). Appellee, seeking to 
avoid cremation, had spoken to a local mortician. Though Appellee initially denied knowledge of 
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the note's content, upon Appellant' s inquiry, Appellee denied the existence of any cremation request, 
stating that the note's only content for Appellant was Mr. Hughes' declaration of love for her. 
(T1200 at 48-51, 53, 55, 57, 58). Being so advised, Appellant, in mourning, accepted Appellee's 
version. Concurrently, Appellee, seeking to avoid cremation, had already retained a mortuary to 
transport Mr. Hughes' body to Utah for burial which occurred in St. George on March 8, 2002 
(T1200 at 34:16-24; 63:10-11; 48, 49, 51, 53, 55, 57, 58). 
5. At trial, Appellee disingenuously claimed that she had no knowledge, whatsoever, 
of the decedent's note's contents until Mr. Hughes' body was being transported after New Mexico 
funeral services to St. George, Utah for burial. (T1200 at 57:24-58:2). Regardless, Appellee 
testified that Mr. Hughes' desires, in reference to cremation, were not significant and that Appellee 
did not think once about following her son's directive or honoring his wishes. (T1200 at 58, 60:24-
61:2; T1195 at 26:1-3; 40:4-6). Appellee considered the Paseo Bridge as but an irrelevant mud 
puddle. (T1200 at 58:24-59:6, 60:12-14, 60:24-61:2). And, as Appellee was a member of the LDS 
church, it was significant to her that decedent be buried in a fashion preferable under her 
understanding of Mormon doctrine. (T1200 at 64; Tl 195 at 9:13-14). Indeed, Appellee asserted that 
the Rio Grande location would cause her emotional distress, and, insofar as Appellee did not believe 
in cremation, it would offend her personal sensibility. (Tl 195 at 77:15-78:16). Had the decedent 
requested his ashes to be scattered over Elephant Butte or Lake Powell, Appellee would have 
understood Decedent's request, but not the "mud puddle"named. (Tl 195 at 39). 
6. In the late summer of 2002, while Appellee and Mr. Hughes' former spouse, Marty 
Stroman, litigated issues pertaining to Mr. Hughes' One Million Dollar ($1,000,000.00) life 
insurance policy, Appellant discovered through counsel Mr. Hugh es' written directive for cremation. 
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(T1200 at 62:18-23; 67:14-24). Prior to this time, Appellant was unaware of her husband's desire 
to be cremated. (T1200 at 102:22-23; See also T1200 at 67:14-24, 68:23-24). Appellant disclaimed 
any interest in the One Million Dollars ($ 1,000,000.00), preferring that any interest of hers go to the 
decedent's daughter. (T1200 at 74:7-10; R66). After some heartfelt reflection, Appellant came to 
Utah on November 1, 2002 and filled out those state forms necessary honor her husband's request. 
Having lost twenty (20) pounds before trial, Appellant was devastated that no one was honoring her 
husband's wishes. (T1200 at 114:3-15). Had Appellant earlier been aware ofthe note's instructions, 
Appellant would have cremated her husband from the outset. Id. Though disinterment is not 
uncommon and the state has preprinted forms facilitating the same, Appellee thereafter sought to 
enjoin Mr. Hughes' disinterment and cremation as per the decedent's and his widow's wishes. 
(T1200at8-10,Rl-4). 
7. Though the evidence is contested, the trier of fact, the Honorable James L. Shumate, 
hearing the testimony of both Appellant and Appellee, over two days of trial in December 2002, 
concluded that Appellant, despite inquiry, had not been advised of her husband's request of 
cremation until sometime after his burial in St. George. (R397). The matter was then continued until 
April 15, 2003 to allow the parties to discuss settlement. (R398). 
ADDITIONAL EQUITABLE FACTS 
Normally, procedural facts are not independently significant to argument, but as injunctive 
relief is an equitable remedy, the following facts pertaining to the course of proceedings must be 
placed squarely before the Court of Appeals. 
8. On April 14, 2003 at 3:00 p.m., Appellee's counsel telephoned Appellant's counsel 
and requested a continuance ofthe April 15, 2003 trial setting. (R139). As Appellant and her 
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witnesses were already on a plane from New Mexico, Appellant's counsel would not consent to a 
continuance. Appellant's counsel was not informed of an eleventh hour Rule 63, Utah R. Civ. P. 
Motion to Recuse Judge Shumate. Id 
9. Less than two hours later, at 4:55 p.m. on April 14, 2003, Appellee's counsel filed 
a Verified Motion to Recuse Judge Shumate. (R115). The motion was discovered on April 15,2003 
by an electronic examination of court pleadings. Consequently, on her arrival in Utah, Appellant and 
her witnesses had no recourse but to await a judicial ruling on disqualification. (R140 at f 8; Rule 
63, Utah R. Civ. P.). On April 15, 2003 Appellee and her counsel appeared at the now unscheduled 
afternoon hearing. Seeking specifically to take ex parte advantage of Appellant, Appellee then 
orally withdrew her Motion to Recuse and on two occasions Appellee's counsel moved the Court 
to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. (T1197 at 1-4; see also, T1199 at 23:12-24). Judge 
Shumate clearly stated "your motion is granted counsel", concluding that, "the matter is dismissed". 
(Tl 197 at 4). 
10. At approximately 3:03 p.m., on April 15,2003, Appellant's counsel discovered that 
the Judge had convened a hearing; the clerk's minute entry indicated that the Court had granted 
Petitioner's motion to dismiss. (R130). Appellant's counsel personally spoke to Appellee's counsel 
about Appellee's dismissal, believing the motion had been fomented by new legislation. (Rl 90-92; 
140-44). Both counsel thereafter sought videotapes of the hearing. Appellant's counsel 
telephonically requested, on the morning of April 16, 2003, an opportunity, pursuant to the then 
applicable Rule 4-504, Utah R. Jud. Admin., to review the proposed order of dismissal prior to its 
submission to the Trial Court. Id. Appellee's counsel never returned this call. 
11. On April 16, 2003, contrary to Rule 4-504(2), Utah R. Jud. Admin., Appellee's 
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counsel submitted a contrary "order granting permanent injunction" to Judge Shumate. This Order 
was both signed and filed by Judge Shumate prior to 11:41 a.m on April 16, 2003 and as 
memorialized was immediately served on the Sexton of the St. George Cemetery. (Rl 31; 134). The 
following day, April 17,2003, Appellant's counsel received a copy of this "Order" via regular mail. 
12. Appellant then filed a Rule 5 9(e) Utah R. Civ. P. motion to conform the memorialized 
injunction to the Trial Court's oral ruling. (Rl 94). Appellee responded indicating that the injunction 
was what Judge Shumate "really intended", though Appellee's counsel now verified that he was 
"mistaken" in dismissing the case. (Tl 199 at 22:12-13; 25:19-23; R255, Exhibit 2; cf Tl 199 at 12-
13). Appellee never filed a motion to set aside the oral order of dismissal on any grounds. 
13. Judge Shumate's final ruling on May 19,2003 canbe viewed in the Addendum at A2. 
See also R397. Judge Shumate noted that despite Appellee's counsel's attempt to play ex parte 
"hard ball" to reach a result favorable to his client, the ultimate outcome obtained [a dismissal] did 
not serve the Appellee primarily because of her attorney's "repeated failure to adequately perform 
his duty". (R398). 
14. After noting Appellee's failure to comply with both the Utah R. Civ. P. and the Utah 
R. Jud. Admin., Judge Shumate further noted Appellee's oral motion "to dismiss for failure to 
prosecute . . ." was granted and the Court requested that the pleadings be submitted for signature. 
(R399). The Court then stated that, absent Appellee's compliance to the Utah. R. Jud. Admin., 
Appellee submitted an "Order Granting Permanent Injunction" to the Court. IcL 
15. The Court characterized this "Order Granting Permanent Injunction" as an "erroneous 
order" and thereafter stated that Appellee had failed to address, whatsoever, the merits of Appellant's 
Rule 59 Motion to Amend and simply reargued her case. IdL 
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16. Ultimately, however, the Trial Court Judge held that once Appellee filed her Rule 63 
Motion, the Judge was divested of jurisdiction, less and accepting submitting the Motion to another 
judge or granting the Motion to Recuse, finding that all other motions and orders thereafter were 
rendered moot. (R399-400). 
17. Appellant requested newly assigned Judge Beacham to reconsider Appellant's 
motions and Judge Shumate's ruling of mootness. (R478,487). Judge Beacham correctly ruled that 
the matters submitted to Judge Shumate were not moot, but, thereafter, took it upon himself to make 
his own sua sponte motion to set aside Appellee's dismissal and allow her to reinstate her case. 
(Tl 199 at 43:19-25). The Judge's reasoning that high constitutional principles are involved is ill-
conceived; this matter was little more than legal negligence at best. (Tl 199 at 44:16-23; Tl 199 at 
32-34). 
18. Subsequent thereto, on cross motions for summary judgment, without taking any 
testimony, Judge Beacham entered a global order of summary judgment discounting the decedent's 
directive in light of his suicide which the Court noted compromised the weight accorded decedent's 
wishes. (R866 n.5; R869 at c). And, with no examination of the note, the District Court found the 
fact that Appellant was unaware of her husband's wishes until after the burial to be immaterial. 
(R866). Though not viewing the note, Judge Beacham incorrectly surmised that Appellant did not 
take the position that the note was "a clear and unequivocal expression of Mr. Hughes' wishes". 
(R866-67; cf Addendum 1; T1195 at 28:1-5). Appellant contended otherwise. Thereafter, Judge 
Beacham reasoned that once decedent' s body had been buried in Utah, "Respondent waived any right 
to choose another form of disposition". (R867, citing In re Estate of Mover, 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 
1978). 
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19. Upon motion for reconsideration of the Court's sua sponte motion to reopen the case, 
the District Court Judge, who had indicated on July 9, 2003 that he could not divine the mind of 
Judge Shumate in dismissing the case, nonetheless, chose to recast his own sua sponte motion to set 
aside Appellee's dismissal as merely Judicial prerogative to reconsider one's own opinion. (Rl 187, 
1190). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE NO. I 
Appellee's dismissal of her lawsuit is a valid and forceable order. Though the hearing on 
April 15,2003 was procedurally irregular, Utah Courts have consistently determined that a party who 
leads a Trial Court into error cannot later complain of that error to obtain favorable review. See 
Miriam v. Miriam, 799 P.2d 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Helman v. Paterson, 241 P.2d 910, 913 
(Utah 1952). As the case was dismissed, no further proceedings were required except to conform 
the Appellee's erroneous order submitted to the Trial Court to the order of dismissal entered on the 
record in open court. That this dismissal was entered after Appellee's motion to recuse makes it 
voidable only at Appellant's election, but not void. See, e.g., Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n., 767 P.2d 538, 543-44 (Utah 1988). 
ISSUE NO. II 
The District Court Judge's subsequent sua sponte motion granting Appellee relief from the 
dismissal of her own case is untenable. The Supreme Court of Utah has repeatedly held that a Judge 
is an independent arbiter and should not make motions onbehalf of either party wherein the outcome 
can only favor one party. See, e.g., Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 247 (1983) overruled on 
different grounds by Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115 (Utah 1998). Ultimately, Utah 
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Courts have widely held that relief in civil cases will not be granted a litigant based on the prior 
incompetence ornegligence of counsel. Jennings v. Stoker. 652 P.2d 912,913 (Utah 1982); Maltby 
v. Cox Const. Co.. Inc.. 598 P.2d 336, 339-40 (Utah 1979); Davis v. Grand County Serv. Area. 905 
P.2d 888, 894 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
ISSUE NO. Ill 
Appellee's injunctive relief is barred by the equitable doctrine of unclean hands; those that 
seek equity must do equity. This doctrine has limited application in the law as it is presumptuous 
for Courts to divine an individual general characteristics of goodness or badness as affecting the 
outcome of litigation. Nonetheless, in the event a party exhibits inequitable conduct in relation to 
the very matter in litigation, equity does intercede and bars injunctive relief. See Shell Oil Co. v. 
Stiffler, 48 P.2d 503,509 (Utah 1935); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156.158 (Utah 1976); Hone 
v. Hone, 2004 WL 1574522 (Utah Ct. App.); 43 C.J.S. Injunctions $32 (1978). In the instant case, 
Appellee disregarded decedent's express wishes for cremation and disposal; Appellee actively 
concealed these same wishes from decedent's widow. (Supra at pp. 5,12). Thereafter, the Appellee 
filed a last minute motion to disqualify and later orally withdrew the same only to dismiss her own 
case. (Supra at 6, 14-16). Rather than concern herself with the propriety of preparing a correct and 
conforming order, Appellee prepared a self serving erroneous order. Id And, without compliance 
with Rule 4-504, Utah R. Jud. Admin., Appellee surreptitiously submitted this erroneous non-
conforming order to Judge Shumate for his signature. Appellee's actions in this case are comprised 
of wilful deception coupled with avoidance of longstanding written mandates of legal civility and 
ethics. Id. Ultimately, Appellee blithely submitted a self-serving order to Judge Shumate in 
furtherance of her own desires. KL As for conduct in relation to the very matter in litigation, 
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Appellee is not before the Court with clean hands. Appellee must be denied her equitable relief 
ISSUE NO. IV 
The District Court Judge's legal conclusion that Appellant waived her right to honor her 
deceased husband's wishes is incorrect as a matter of law. (R867). To constitute a waiver there 
must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to 
relinquishit. SeeSoter's, Inc. v. DeseretFed. Sav. &Loan Assn, 857P.2d935,938-40 (Utah 1993). 
In the instant case, the trier of fact found that decedent's burial occurred while Appellee actively 
deceived Appellant regarding decedent's written directive for cremation. The replacement Judge, 
on summary judgment, indicated, that although he had not viewed the written directive, the 
decedent's wishes were not clear, ultimately ruling that the decedent's statements might have lesser 
significance as he was a person "whose mental condition had obviously deteriorated to the point of 
suicide". (R866 n. 5; R869 at c). No case law supports this ruling, to-wit: that a suicidal person 
loses the right to dispose of his assets or to direct the valid disposal of his remains. The case of In 
re Estate of Mover, 577 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah 1978), for example, contains the following statement 
from the Utah Supreme Court: 
[a] person has some interest in his body, and the organs thereof, of such a nature that 
he should be able to make a disposition thereof, which should be recognized and held 
to be binding after his death, so long as it is done within the limits of reason and 
decency as related to the accepting customs of mankind. 
Beyond emaciating the judicially unreviewed written directives of the decedent, the replacement 
Judge thereafter concluded that Appellant had waived the right to honor her husband's wishes once 
he had been buried. Existing Utah case law, however, regarding waiver would require a 
knowledgeable decision to disregard the decedent's ultimate desires concerning his disposal. See 
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Id. at 108. Ultimately, the burden of waiver is a preponderance of evidence upon which Appellee 
cannot prevail. 
ISSUE NO. V 
Pursuant to the majority of case law, disposition of the decedent's remains is vested in the 
decedent's spouse; the District Court's lengthy discussion of Appellee's relationship as decedent's 
mother is inapposite. Both case law and statutes mandate that the surviving spouse's right to 
disposition of the deceased spouse's remains paramount. See, e.g., Hackett v. Hackett 26 A. 42, 
43-44 (R.I. 1893). In this action, Appellant, the legal spouse of decedent, simply desires to honor 
his now revealed directive, a directive which Appellee chose to both ignore and then conceal from 
Appellant. Presently enacted Utah law comports with the law of sister jurisdictions to similarly 
allow this right. See Utah Code Ann. §58-9-602 (2002). 
ISSUE NO. VI 
In entering summary judgment against Appellant, the District Court is mandated to accept 
Appellant's factual statements as true and to draw all inferences in her favor. The District Court 
below summarily viewed all facts in light of Appellee's stated position and in each instance drew 
legal inferences that were contrary to Appellant's assertions, including, inter alia, the clarity of the 
decedent's memorialized directive for cremation, and Appellant's argument that, not knowing of this 
written desire, she could not have knowledgeably waived her rights to dispose of her husband's 
remains. Ultimately, the District court shifted the burden of proof to Appellant contrary to Rule 




ISSUE NO. I 
Appellee's Dismissal of Her Lawsuit Obtained in Open Court Is Valid, 
Enforceable, and Bars the Further Maintenance of Appellee's Cause of Action 
The facts in reference to this argument are set forth supra, pages 5-8, 13-16, with citation to 
the record. The transcript of the hearing upon which this argument is fomented is located at Rl 197. 
At this hearing, Appellee, through her counsel, moved on multiple occasions to obtain an order of 
dismissal of Appellee's suit. Judge Shumate granted Appellee's Motion and, thereafter, in an 
attempt to avoid the affects of her motion, Appellee surreptitiously submitted an erroneous contrary 
order to Judge Shumate for his signature. (Seed's 9-15 pp. 14-16, supra). At no time did Appellee 
formally move to set aside the effects of this dismissal. The issue then remains what effect the 
Judge's pronouncement of dismissal at Appellee's request in open court and Appellee's subsequent 
submission of an erroneous order have under the law. 
A. Nearly Every Jurisdiction Deems Actions by a Disqualified Judge to Be 
Voidable but Not Void. 
Utah case law has not yet resolved the jurisdictional validity of orders entered by a Judge 
after the filing of a motion for disqualification. The Utah Supreme Court in Madsen v. Prudential 
Fed. Sav. & Loan, 767 P.2d 538, 543-44 (Utah 1988), however, recognized that a genuine 
jurisdictional issue exists pertaining to the ultimate validity of such rulings. The Madsen Court, 
however, did not ultimately rule on this issue because it concluded "that disqualification of the trial 
judge was not appropriate . . . " Id. at 544. Nonetheless, several states have dealt extensively with 
this issue; nearly every jurisdiction deems actions by a disqualified judge to be merely voidable 
under limited circumstances, but not void. See Stebbins v. White, 235 Cal. Rptr. 656, 664-67 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1987); Wilson v. State, 521 N.E.2d 363, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); see also, 24 A.L.R 4th 
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870; Waiver or Loss of Right to Disqualify Judge by Participation in Proceedings - - Modern States 
Civil Cases; 40A CJ.S. Judges §158 (1981); 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judges §231. 
For example, in the Stebbins case, the California Court of Appeals determined that 
"[he] [who] consents to an act is not wronged by it", upholding the actions of a disqualified Judge 
who had engaged in a hearing at a litigant's request despite that same litigant's prior motion to 
disqualify. 235 Cal. Reptr. at 665. With similar language, the Utah Court of Appeals held in 
Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172.1175-76 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) that a party who leads the Trial 
Court into error cannot later complain of that error to obtain reversal. See also Helman v. Patterson, 
241 P.2d 910, 913 (Utah 1952). In Stebbins, a litigant filed a motion to recuse the presiding judge 
the morning before the scheduled trial. 23 5 Cal. Rptr. at 664. Subsequent to the motion being filed, 
a hearing was held and the judge advised the parties that it was his "statutory obligation to refer the 
question... to the master trial department for a determination". Id.; cf Rule 63 Utah R. Civ P. The 
Stebbins court further stated "that the matter would be referred to another judge for resolution of the 
disqualification motion before any decisions could be made". Stebbins, 235 Cal Reptr. at 664. The 
filing attorney thereafter continued in colloquy with the Court and "[t]he court inquired: c [D]id you 
file it to get a continuance? I have no problem with a continuance. If you want to withdraw it you 
can do it'. White responded:'I withdraw it". Id at 665. Subsequent to the hearing, White attempted 
to repudiate his withdrawal and asserted that "his peremptory challenge was irrevocable and that 
Judge Grande's decisions and judgment were therefore void". Id. The California Court of Appeals 
in Stebbins stated, however, that "it is clear that the right to urge the disqualification of a judge for 
most causes under section 170 and peremptory under section 170.6 may be waived by the parties. 
Consequently, the actions of a disqualified judge are not void in any fundamental sense, but at most 
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voidable if properly raised by an interested party." Id. at 665. The Stebbins court thereafter 
concluded that: 
White cannot be permitted to withdraw his motion to disqualify Judge 
Grant on his own volition and instigation, and to expressly consent to 
proceeding before Judge Grande, and yet secretly preserve his 
objection for appeal in the event of an adverse judgment. As a 
maximum juris prudence pithily puts its, "[he] who consents to an act 
is not wronged by it" . . . In short, White waived his right to complain 
of proceeding before Judge Grande. 
Id 
In the present case, Appellee orally withdrew her motion to recuse Judge Shumate as in the 
Stebbins case and then proceeded ex parte to move the Trial Court for dismissal of Appellee's case. 
(Tl 197). Despite obtaining a videotape of the hearing, Appellee thereafter submitted, contrary to 
Rule 4-504, Utah R. Jud. Admin., an erroneous written order to the Trial Court Judge completely 
opposite of the oral order, flf's 9-15, supra at pp. 13-16). The initial inquiry, however, is whether 
any order issued by the District Court Judge is valid. Again, the law as set forth above generally 
holds that the judicial acts of a disqualified Judge are not void, but voidable only, and then only at 
the behest of Appellant, the non-participating party. The fact that there is a pending motion for 
disqualification, however, does not operate to divest the Judge of essential jurisdiction. Similarly, 
in Wilson v. State, 521 N.E.2d 363, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), the Indiana Court of Appeals 
determined that "the rulings a disqualified judge makes are not void per se, but simply voidable". 
Upholding the Judge's rulings entered subsequent to disqualification, the Wilson Court stated as 
follows: 
In this case appellant was aware Judge Molter had disqualified 
himself at the time of the disqualification. Nevertheless, at the 
hearing on the state's motion to correct errors, Wilson did not raise 
the issue that a judge who had disqualified himself earlier, Judge 
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Molter could not rescind his disqualification without affirmatively 
demonstrating valid grounds for reinstatement. Therefore, Wilson has 
waived this portion of his argument for the purposes of appeal. 
Id 
Judge Shumate's order of dismissal in the instant case obtained at the behest of the Appellee 
is only voidable, but not void. The only party that could seek to invalidate the same would be 
Appellant who did not participate in the hearing, and seek the order's reinstatement. 
B. The Erroneous Written Order Entered by the Trial Court Should Have Been 
Modified below to Conform to the Order as Orally Rendered. 
On pages 3 and 4 of Tl 197 the following colloquy takes place: 
Mr. Bernard: I'll take - - I'll take your honor's word at that and - - and withdraw 
the motion to recuse and make a motion to dismiss for failure to 
prosecute, your Honor. 
The Court: Your motion is granted counsel. 
Mr. Bernard: Thank you your Honor. 
The Court: The matter is dismissed. If you'll submit the pleadings 
counsel, I'll sign them. 
Mr. Bernard: Thank you, your Honor. (Whereupon the matter was 
concluded). 
At this moment in time, on April 15,2003, Appellee's counsel was required, pursuant to Rule 
4-504(2), Utah R. Jud. Admin., to serve upon opposing counsel copies of the proposed judgment 
or order for review. (See Addendum at A41). Within minutes thereafter, Appellant's counsel spoke 
to Appellee's counsel at the courthouse about the dismissal. (R190-92; 140-44). The following 
morning, on April 16, 2003, Appellant's counsel telephonically requested a copy of the dismissal 
order before its submission to Judge Shumate. IcL Contrary to applicable rules, however, Appellee 
submitted an erroneous order granting herself a permanent injunction; this order was signed and filed 
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before 11:41 a.m. that same day. (R131, 134). As a matter of law, both federal and Utah Courts 
have determined that the oral order of the Court controls where there are discrepancies between that 
order and a subsequent inaccurate written form of an order. See United States v. Munoz-DelaRosa, 
495F.2d253,256(9thCir. 1974); see also United States v. Mason, 440 F.2d 1293.1299-1300 (10th 
Cir. 1971) (cited in Parry v. State, 837 P.2d 998, 999 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). That Appellee's order 
for permanent injunction executed by the Court is erroneous is amply set forth by Judge Shumate 
in his May 19, 2003 order wherein the Trial Court correctly noted that Appellee had attempted to 
play "hard ball" to reach a favorable result, but that the outcome did not serve the Appellee based 
upon Appellee's attorney's "repeated failure to adequately perform his duty". (R 398). In reference 
to the April 16, 2003 written order, Judge Shumate characterized the same as erroneous and further 
noted that Appellee had failed to respond with any substantive arguments to Appellant's motion and 
memorandum to amend the written order to conform with the Court's oral dismissal of Appellee's 
case. Id. Thereafter, however, Judge Shumate incorrectly held that his actions and Appellant's 
motion were moot as he was without jurisdiction once Appellee's motion to disqualify had been 
filed. (R399-400). 
C. The Trial Court Committed an "Error in Law" When it Ruled That its Actions 
Undertaken after the Filing of Appellee's Rule 63 Motion, Together with All 
Such Motions Pertaining to the Erroneous Written Order, Were Rendered 
Moot. 
On May 19, 2003, rather than conform the memorialized order granting a permanent 
injunction to the oral order dismissing the case, the Trial Court determined that its actions 
undertaken after Appellee filed her motion to disqualify were invalid and that subsequent motions 
filed to correct the erroneous order and substantively unopposed by Appellee were moot. (R399-
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400). The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have both determined that a case is 
moot only "[i]f the request for judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants". Duran v. 
Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981); Leavitt v. Dept. of Agric. Case No., 971300-CA (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). (Addendum at A19). In Leavitt, the Court of Appeals overturned the District Court's 
ruling that the Leavitt's pending motion to amend their complaint to add a nuisance claim, filed 
before summary judgment, was moot when defendant was granted summary judgment subsequently 
on the initial complaint. (Leavitt, Addendum at A20). The Court of Appeals recited the above 
definition of mootness and determined "[i]f the Trial Court had allowed the Leavitts to amend, their 
suit against the county would have stayed alive, and they could have further pursued the nuisance 
claim. We thus conclude the Trial Court incorrectly dismissed as moot the Leavitt's motion to 
amend their complaint." Id. 
An "error of law" similarly occurred in this case because, once again, the relief requested by 
Appellant would indeed effect the legal rights of the litigants. Before the Trial Court, Appellant 
motioned that the erroneous injunctive order conform to the oral ruling of dismissal entered by the 
Court at the behest of Appellee. This Motion, regarding which Appellee offered no opposition, 
would certainly affect the rights of the litigants. Id Simply stated, in this case Appellant requested 
that the oral order rendered by the Trial Court on Appellee's Motion supercede Appellee's 
deceitfully drafted written order. It cannot be gainsaid that as to the issue of mootness, Judge 
Beacham ultimately concurred, striking that language in Judge Shumate's ruling which indicated that 




D. Appellee Is Barred from Opposing the Order of Dismissal Obtained by Her 
Counsel's Motion. 
In the instant case, Appellee filed a Motion to Recuse Judge Shumate on April 14, 2003 at 
4:55 p.m. (Rl 15). Pursuant to Rule 63, Utah R. Civ. P., once the motion and affidavit had been 
filed, Judge Shumate had two limited options in the case, neither of which allowed for a judicial 
hearing. See Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1994; Addendum at A35). 
Appellee's counsel, however, subsequent to his filing Appellee's Motion to Recuse, appeared at the 
hearing, orally withdrew his motion and requested the Court to proceed ex parte in the instant case. 
Appellant's counsel conferenced with Appellee's counsel immediately subsequent to the hearing and 
expressed appreciation for the dismissal. That dismissal should presently be reinstated by the Utah 
Court of Appeals. Indeed, Utah Courts have determined that a party who leads the Trial Court into 
error cannot later complain of that error to obtain a different result. See Merriam v. Mercians 799 
P.2d 1172, 1175-76 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Helman v. Paterson. 241 P.2d 910, 913 (Utah 1952). 
Though no hearing should have taken place, Appellee is, nonetheless, barred from complaining about 
the hearing and the judgment orally rendered therein unfavorable to Appellee's case. As Appellant 
has set forth above, the Trial Court Judge retained jurisdiction in the instant case and the erroneous 
written order should have been made to conform to that order of dismissal reflected in the transcript. 
ISSUE NO. II 
The Replacement District Court Judge's Subsequent Sua Sponte Motion 
Granting Appellee Relief from Her Dismissal Is Legally Untenable. 
On July 9, 2003, Appellant orally argued her motion that Judge Shumate's oral order was 
jurisdictionally valid, and that the previously executed erroneous order be modified to conform to 
the same. (T1199 at 1-21; 36). The replacement Judge, the Honorable G. Rand Beacham, agreed 
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with Appellant's counsel that Judge Shumate indeed had authority and jurisdiction in the case and, 
thus, Judge Shumate's rulings as well as Appellant's earlier motion were not moot. (Tl 199 at 43). 
Despite Judge Shumate's ruling of May 19,2003, which clarifies that the order as orally pronounced 
was one clearly of dismissal, the replacement Judge then concluded that to order the dismissal 
somehow involved divining Judge Shumate's intent at the April 15,2003 hearing. (Tl 199 at 34:23-
25). Judge Beacham again noted that Appellee had not adequately responded whatsoever to 
Appellant's Rule 59 Motion, instead attempting to argue the ultimate merits of her case. (Tl 199 at 
24,31). Incongruous to the hearing, Judge Beacham then digressed, discussing a movie he reviewed 
on July 8, 2003, particularly a concluding scene in "The Untouchables". See T1199 at 32-34. 
Significantly, Appellee had no motion pending before the Judge seeking relief from the dismissal. 
(T1199 at 37-38). Though Appellee's counsel conceded he had misspoken on April 15, 2003, 
Appellee provided no explanation as to why she egregiously submitted an erroneous order to the 
Trial Court for execution absent compliance with Rule 4-504, Utah R. Jud. Admin. (Tl 199 at 42). 
Incongruously, Judge Beacham then partly allocated blame for the Appellee's ill-conceived motion 
to Appellant indicating that somehow Appellant's counsel had a duty to appear at the hearing and 
help Appellee's counsel with his confusion. Id, Clearly, it is not the duty of Appellant's counsel to 
prevent the legal negligence of opposing counsel. Furthermore, insofar as Appellee had filed a 
motion to recuse, Appellant's counsel had no independent duty to assume that ex parte proceedings 
before the Trial Court Judge would be initiated by Appellee. See Rule 63, Utah R. Civ. P. 
Ultimately, the Judge's action vacating the Order to dismiss is concisely set forth as follows: 
On my own motion, I am vacating the oral order to dismiss in the sense that it may 
be understood to constitute an oral order to dismiss the case - - the petition in the 
case. I'm doing that because, so far as I can tell, it was mistaken, it was based - - it 
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was based on improper procedure, and it was based on misrepresentations, whether 
negligently or otherwise, by the Appellee's attorney. 
T1199at44. 
In the above pronouncement, Judge Beacham paternalistically intervened for Appellee and 
singularly relieved her of her dismissal. This action was fomented apparently in large part because 
of a certain antipathy the Judge felt toward the judicial processes as illustrated in a movie he viewed 
the night before, particularly the concluding scene of "The Untouchables" which the Judge found 
illustrative of Appellee's dismissal. (Tl 199 at 32-34). Utah Courts, however, have widely held that 
u[t]he general rule is that in civil cases a new trial will not be granted based on the incompetence or 
negligence of one's own trial counsel". Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912, 913 (Utah 1982); see 
Maltbv v. Cox Const. Co., Inc., 598 P.2d 336, 341 (Utah 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 945 (1979) 
(cited in Davis v. Grand County Serv. Area, 905 P.2d 888, 894 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). In Davis, the 
Utah Court of Appeals further determined that "[i]n the civil context, a malpractice action, not a new 
trial, is frequently suggested as the appropriate remedy for the client whose counsel's performance 
falls below the standard of professional competence". Id; see also Carroll v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 654 
P.2d 775, 778 (Call982); Palverari v. Finta, 26 A.2d 229,230 (Conn. 1942); Wooddy v. Wooddv, 
261 A.2d 486, 495 (Md. 1970); Farmer Found. Co. v. Leach, 680 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1984) (cited in Davis v. Grand County Serv. Area, 905 P.2d 888, 894 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). 
Consequently, the replacement Judge's sua sponte motion and corollary ruling granting unsolicited 
relief for Appellee should be set aside and Appellee's dismissal reinstated pursuant to her own 
motion granted on April 15, 2003. Indeed, the then presiding Trial Court Judge specifically found 
that Appellee's "hard ball" motion ultimately made no sense and produced a harsh result for 
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Appellee [dismissal]. (Addendum at A3-A4). Legal negligence, however, rarely makes sense and, 
indeed produces results ill-suited to clients. Relief from negligence, however, should be Appellee's 
option against one of her former counsel and not the onerous burden of an independent judiciary. 
Ultimately, our civil justice system is adversarial in nature and Judges should function as 
independent arbiters rather than as advocates raising and ruling on their own motions to relieve a 
litigant from counsel's negligence or malfeasance and work an injustice against the other party. 
Judge Stewart, writing for the Utah Supreme Court in Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 247 
(Utah 1983), overruled on different grounds by Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115 (Utah 
1998), clearly established this legal principle, to-wit: that a Judge functions as an independent 
arbiter and should not make motions on behalf of either party. In this case, the replacement Judge's 
sua sponte motion illustrated in some part by the Judge's cinematic antipathy to "The Untouchables" 
violates both the thrust and spirit of the Girard case. 
The District Court Judge's subsequent refraining of his motion and order of July 9, 2003 is 
inaccurate as a matter of law. On August 25, 2003, the Appellant in the instant case filed a motion 
seeking a rehearing from the Court's sua sponte motion and order relieving Appellee of her 
dismissal. (R839). Approximately three (3) months later on October 18, 2003, Appellee responded 
to Appellant's August 25, 2003 motion. (R1002). Absent citation to any case law, Appellee's 
argument was that there was never an order of dismissal to set aside. In point of fact, however, there 
was an erroneous memorialized order and the motion before the Trial Court, properly plead, 
requested that the erroneous written order conform to the oral dismissal of Appellee's case. While 
Judge Beacham in July 2003 stated that he could not divine Judge Shumate's mental state in ordering 
the case dismissed, this is belied by Judge Shumate overt frustration that the written order submitted 
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by Appellee on the morning of April 16, 2003 was erroneous and non-conforming. (Addendum at 
A3-A4). Moreover, Judge Beacham's contention that there was no judgment to consider pursuant 
to Rule 58(A)(c), Utah R. Civ. P. misstates the facts of the case. Indeed, there was a transcript, an 
unsigned minute entry, and an erroneous Rule 58(A)(c) written order signed and filed with the Court 
on April 16,2003. (T1197, R130-31,134). Judge Beacham indicated, however, that his sua sponte 
motion and order vacating the dismissal was within his discretion to simply reconsider an oral order 
before final submission. Rl 189-90, citing inter alia, Brookside Mobile Home Ltd. v. Peebles, 48 
P.3d 968 (Utah 2002). Ultimately, the District Court indicated that, as there was no authority that 
a sitting Judge cannot "change his or her mind", the sua sponte alteration of the judgment was 
specifically allowed. (Rl 191). The cases cited by the lower Court, however, involve a District Court 
Judge making an oral pronouncement from the bench and, upon reconsideration of his own record, 
altering his judicial ruling in the final memorialized order. In the instant case, however, Appellee 
submitted the erroneous memorialized order to the trial Judge contrary to Rule 4-504, Utah R. Jud. 
Admin., on April 16, 2003. There was never a motion before Judge Shumate or, for that matter, 
before Judge Beacham to reconsider the granting of the motion to dismiss which was clear from the 
transcript. (Tl 199 at 37-38). Appellant's pending motion before the Court in July was, again, to 
simply have the erroneous written order conform to the dismissal of the case. (T1199 at 24:16-19, 
argument I, supra). Consequently, Judge Beacham made a motion to sua sponte set aside an existing 
order which the law required to be modified to reflect dismissal. (Tl 199 at 44:9-15). Having made 
Appellee's motion for her, Judge Beacham granted the same. Id. Justification of this motion 
fomented on the concept of judicial reconsideration of oral pronouncements is inapposite.(Rl 189-
91). Thus, though Judge Beacham recited judicial powers "allowed to do justice despite one 
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attorney's incompetence or another's opportunism", there is no case law which would support a 
District Court Judge relieving Appellee of her counsel's negligence absent some minimal motion 
seeking relief therefrom. And, judicial reconsideration is a misnomer where a succeeding Judge tries 
to set aside the unambiguous rulings of his predecessor on the same case. Clearly, granting Appellee 
this form of relief from her counsel's negligent and/or egregious practice does not involve 
constitutional principles. 
It is submitted that there was a Rule 58A, Utah R. Civ. P., order executed by Judge Shumate 
on April 16, 2003. It is further submitted that Utah law would mandate that this order be made 1o 
conform with the oral pronouncements which Judge Shumate stated decidedly dismissed Appellee's 
case and produced a result inimcable to her interests. Justification for sua sponte setting aside the 
dismissal, which order should have only been modified to reflect the truth, cannot be found by 
simple referral to the principle of judicial reconsideration. The cases cited by the replacement Judge 
are, simply st ated, inapposite to the actual facts of this case. Furthermore, allocating fault to 
Appellant by her failure to appear at a hearing which, pursuant to Rule 63, Utah R. Civ. P., should 
never have occurred, is inappropriate. See Rl 189; cf Rule 63(b)(2), Utah R. Civ. P. (where it is 
clearly set forth that the Judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall, without 
further hearing, enter an order granting the motion or certifying the motion and affidavit to a 
reviewing Judge). 
It cannot be gainsaid that Appellant is without fault believing that no hearing would take 
place on the afternoon of April 15,2003. It cannot be gainsaid, however, pursuant to the arguments 
set forth in the first point above, that Appellee is bound by those rulings she elicited by voluntary 
ex parte colloquy with the then presiding District Court Judge. See Issue I, supra. 
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ISSUE III 
Appellee Is Barred from Obtaining Injunctive Relief by the 
Doctrine of Unclean Hands: Those That Seek Equity must Do Equity. 
There is ample law barring Appellee's injunctive relief in the instant case as Appellee does 
not have the prerequisite clean hands to justify equitable relief. Utah Courts have long recognized 
that "a court of equity is a court of conscience, and anyone appealing to or asking the aid of such 
court should do it with clean hands . . . anyone who seeks equity must be willing to do equity". Shell 
Oil Co. v. Stiffler, 48 P.2d 503, 509 (Utah 1935) (citation omitted). In Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 
P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
It is inherent in the nature and purpose of equity that it will grant relief only when 
fairness and good conscience so demand. Correlated to this is the precept that equity 
does not reward one who has engaged in fraud or deceit in the business under 
consideration, but reserves its rewards for those who are themselves acting in fairness 
and good conscience, or as is sometimes said, to those who have come into court 
with clean hands. 
This Court of Appeals recently declared with respect to the doctrine of unclean hands in the case of 
Hone v. Hone, 2004 WL1574522, f7 (Utah Ct. App.) that "a party who seeks an equitable remedy 
must have acted in good faith and not in violation of equitable principles". Moreover, the doctrine 
of unclean hands is clearly applicable to the issuing of injunctions as set forth in 43 C.J.S. 
Injunctions §32 (1978), wherein the authors state: 
he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. . . is applicable in suits to 
obtain relief by injunction. Injunction will be denied, even though Plaintiff shows 
that he has a right and would otherwise be entitled to the remedy in case it appears 
that he himself acted dishonestly, fraudulently, or illegally with respect to the matter 
in which redress is sought, or where he has encouraged, invited, or contributed to the 
injuries sought to be enjoined. However, the general principal that he who comes 
into equity must come with clean hands applies only to Plaintiff' s conduct in relation 
to the very matter in litigation. 
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In the instant case, it is clear that regardless of obtaining the clear, memorialized directive 
from the decedent to be cremated with his ashes scattered near the Rio Grande River, Appellee from 
the outset chose to ignore those requests based on Appellee's personal religious beliefs and her 
feeling that the site the decedent selected for scattering his ashes was aesthetically unpleasing to her. 
(Tl 195 at 39, 77:15-76:8). Indeed, Appellee openly stated that at no time did she intend to give any 
deference whatsoever to the decedent's wishes; in Appellee's world, her wishes were and are 
paramount. (T1200 at 58:22-23; 60:24-61:2; T1195 at 26:1-3; 40:4-6). On multiple occasions, 
Appellant, who on one occasion had heard her husband's oral request to be cremated, asked Appellee 
if Appellant's husband had left written instructions requesting cremation. Initially, Appellee's family 
members, notably Steven who had recovered the note, at Appellee's request advised Appellant that 
they knew not the contents of the note, as it was addressed to Appellee. Appellant was then advised 
that it was up to Appellee to tell Appellant of the note's dictates. (T1200 at 24:14-19; 96-97; 
T1196:1 -14). Appellee, upon Appellant' s inquiry, concealed that such request had been made even 
though the note clearly states the decedent's request. (T1196 at 117:19-118:11; pp. 5,11-12, supra, 
cf Addendum at Al). 
At trial, Appellee, in possession of the note from the Saturday after decedent's passing, 
portrayed herself as not having viewed the note until after the initial funeral services in New Mexico 
on the following Wednesday, (pp. 5, 11-12, supra). Furthermore, the only trier of fact, Judge 
Shumate, found, based on two days testimony from both Appellant and Appellee, that Appellant was 
not advised of her husband's directives regarding cremation until "[s]ometime following the burial". 
(R397). This deception on Appellee's part was active and reproachful. Appellee's inequitable 
behavior should not be rewarded; rather, the principles of equity demand that Appellee's injunction 
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be vacated. Such denial of equitable relief was the result in Hone v Hone, 2004 WL1574522 (Utah 
Ct. App.), wherein this Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court's decision to deny equitable relief 
based on the doctrine of unclean hands where two brothers had deceptively transferred the title of 
their mother's home out of a trust and into one of the brother's names, with the agreement that the 
home would be transferred back into the trust upon their mother's death, in an effort to avoid a 
Medicaid lien on the property. Id. at ^3. When the brother who received the property refused to 
transfer the property back to the trust upon the mother's death, the other brother brought action in 
District Court requesting that the Court exercise its equitable powers and require the transfer of the 
property back into the trust. Id. at f 4. However, based on the doctrine of unclean hands, the Trial 
Court refused to grant the requested relief as the original transfer of the property was made to 
defraud and deceive a third party. Id. In affirming the Trial Court's decision, this Court of Appeals, 
Judge Billings writing for the Court, upheld the Trial Court's decision and held that the doctrine of 
unclean hands barred the equitable relief. Id. at f 11. Thus, this Court of Appeals determined that 
the doctrine of unclean hands prevented a party from receiving equitable relief when that party had 
engaged in fraudulent and deceitful conduct toward a third party who was not even a litigant in the 
matter. In the case at hand, Appellee's deceitful conduct toward Appellant, who is an actual party 
in the matter and whose rights have been adversely affected by Appellee's deceitful conduct, 
militates against awarding Appellee injunctive relief. 
In addition, it is significant to note that Appellee's motion to disqualify Judge Shumate was 
filed at 4:55 p.m. on April 14,2003 and has yet to be received by Appellant's counsel. (Rl 15,121, 
126, 129, 138-44). Thirdly, appearing at the now unscheduled hearing, Appellee sought litigious 
advantage by orally withdrawing her Motion to Recuse and engaging the Trial Judge ostensibly to 
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advance her cause ex parte. (Tl 197 at 1-4; Tl 199 at 23:12-24). The order orally entered, however, 
did not serve Appellee's paramount desires. Despite notice of her dismissal and despite a prior 
request from Appellant's counsel to review the order prior to its submission to Judge Shumate, 
Appellee simply drafted an erroneous self-serving order and contrary to applicable rules, submitted 
it to Judge Shumate on the morning of April 16, 2003 for execution. See Rule 4-504 Utah R. Jud. 
Admin, (repealed and replaced by Utah R. Civ. P. (2004)); see also. Ruling of Judge James L. 
Shumate on Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment in the Addendum at A2, filed May 19, 2003. It 
was of no concern, whatsoever, to Appellee that the order did not conform to Judge Shumate's oral 
pronouncements. The only thing significant is that the order was what Appellee wanted and that it 
reached Judge Shumate's desk absent opposing counsel's review. Judge Shumate characterized this 
onerous episode of Appellee and her counsel's behavior as "playing hard ball" and obtaining a result 
contrary to Appellee's interest while attempting to take advantage of a trusting judiciary. (A3-A4). 
In examining Appellee's egregious behavior in the instant case, this Court should note that 
most jurisdictions hold that the desires of a decedent regarding disposition of his remains are 
important, if not the most significant factor to consider. See Cordts v. Cordts, 118 P.2d 556, 558 
(Kan. 1941); Tkaczvk v. Gallagher, 222 A.2d 226,228 (Conn. 1965); Guerinv. Cassidy, 119 A.2d 
780, 782 (N.J. 1955). As stated in the Utah Supreme Court case of In re Estate of Mover, 577 P.2d 
108, 110 (Utah 1978): 
a person has some interest in his body, and the organs thereof, of such a nature that 
he should be able to make a disposition thereof, which should be recognized and held 
to be binding after his death, so long as that is done within the limits of reason and 
decency as related to the accepted customs of mankind. 
Appellant's husband misplaced his trust in leaving his memorialized desires for cremation 
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with Appellee. The decedent's apparent belief that such desires would be honestly and openly 
communicated were ill-conceived. Even upon inquiry, Appellee chose to lie, affirming that her 
burial wishes for the decedent were paramount to the decedent's own written request. (Supra at 11-
12). Appellee and her former counsel during litigation further chose to abuse those salutary rules 
and procedures which are ethically mandated for all litigants. (R397-401; pp 6-7, 14-16 supra). In 
the instant case, Appellee's conduct has been reproachful throughout. As clearly set forth above, 
equity bars Appellee from obtaining an equitable remedy such as an injunction. Appellant should 
be permitted to honor her deceased husband's wishes, Appellee's personal sensibilities and religious 
beliefs notwithstanding. 
ISSUE NO. IV 
The District Court Judge's Legal Conclusion That Appellant Waived Her 
Right to Honor Her Deceased Husband's Wishes Is Incorrect as a Matter of Law. 
Respondent did not waive her right to cremate her husband's remains according to the 
decedent's wishes because she acted in a reasonably timely fashion after discovery of decedent's 
written directive. See, e.g., Spanich v. Reichelderfer, 628 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). 
In the instant case, Appellant was not able to read her husband's cremation directive until she 
obtained counsel during the late summer following decedent's burial.(Tl 196 at 117-118, 121-122, 
147:9-14). This information had theretofore been wrongfully withheld from Appellant by Appellee 
and Appellee's extended family. (Supra at 5-7,11-13). In the Spanich case cited above, the spouse 
desiring to disinter the body was ultimately doing so to spite the family. In this action, however, 
Appellant has by a letter dated November 12,2002, already disclaimed any funds that are involved 
by reason of insurance ($1,000,000.00) or any claim to decedent's surviving estate. Furthermore, 
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after heartfelt consideration, Appellant decided to honor the wishes of her late husband. In so doing, 
she seeks to simply right a deceitful wrong that has taken place in reference to her husband's desires 
as to the disposal of his own remains. 
In Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. 857 P.2d 935, 938-42 (Utah 1993), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that to constitute a waiver there must be an existing right, benefit, or 
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it. Prior common law and 
existing Utah law designate the surviving legally recognized spouse of the decedent as having a 
primary right to seek to honor the decedent's wishes. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann §58-9-602 (2002). 
It cannot be gainsaid that the Appellant sought to determine, in the instant case, whether her husband 
had expressed a memorialized wish to be cremated, a wish that Appellant had heard orally on one 
prior occasion. (T1200 at 90:20-24; 103:1-12; 19-24). Appellee actively deceived Appellant 
regarding her husband's written directive, and, thus, Appellant's consent to burial in Utah occurred 
absent her knowledge of her husband's directive. (Supra at 12-13; R3 97). Absent knowledge of that 
directive for cremation, the second prong of the Soter's ruling cannot be established. Herein, the 
only trier of fact consistently found that the burial wishes of Appellant's deceased husband were 
concealed from Appellant until sometime after his burial in Utah. Id. Incongruously, the 
succeeding District Court Judge, who had no opportunity to review the parties' testimony, ruled on 
summary judgment that, though he had not examined the decedent's written directive, he, 
nonetheless, concluded that Appellant was not asserting that the note "was a clear and unequivocal 
expression of Mr. Hughes' wishes". (R867). This Judge further found that as decedent had taken 
his own life, his requests might be given lesser significance as he was a person "whose mental 
condition had obviously deteriorated to the point of suicide". ( R866 at n.5; R869 at c). It is 
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incongruous to suggest that a person choosing suicide cannot intelligently choose how to dispose of 
his own remains, or that his request should be given any less weight than a person's whose directive 
is contained in any other testamentary document. Such a ruling would be akin to arguing that 
suicidal people are incapable of possessing testamentary intent or that their wishes should simply be 
accorded no deference whatsoever. This would run directly contrary to Utah law. See Bergen v. 
Travelers Ins., Co., 776 P.2d 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also In re Estate of Mclntvre, 2000 
WL3319154 (Tenn Ct. App. 2000; Addendum at A23). Ultimately, the burden of waiver is a 
preponderance of evidence upon which the Appellee cannot prevail. To sustain the lower court's 
decision that Appellant waived the right to honor her husband's wishes once he had been buried, the 
succeeding District Court Judge would have to chronologically reverse the finding recited by the 
Trial Court that Appellant's discovery of her husband' swishes occurred only after his burial. (R397). 
Simply stated, it is difficult to waive a right to honor one's husband's requests when those requests 
are actively concealed from you. See Soter's, Inc., 857 P.2d at 835. 
ISSUE NO. V 
Both the Common Law and Statutory Law of Utah Support Appellant, 
Mrs. Dozzo-Hughes' Right to Disinter and Cremate Her Husband's Remains 
According to His Burial Wishes. 
Rule 65A(e), Utah R. Civ P., provides that: 
[a] preliminary injunction may issue only upon a showing by the applicant that: 
(e)(1) the applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or 
injunction issues; 
(e)(2) the threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever 
damage the proposed order or injunction may cause the party 
restrained or enjoined; 
(e)(3)The order of injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the 
public interest; and 
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(e)(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail 
on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious 
issues on the merits which should be the subject of further litigation. 
Clearly, under Utah law, Appellee bears the burden to satisfy each conjunctive prong before an 
injunction should be issued by the District Court. See Utah Med. Prod., Inv., v Searsy, 958 P.2d 
228,232-33 (Utah 1998). In the instant case, decedent passed on without a designated executor. As 
the legal spouse of the decedent, Appellant would have, under common law, the sole discretion to 
elect a suitable disposition of her husband's remains. Hackett v. Hackett 26 A. 42, 43-44 (R.I. 
1893); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878 (Pa. 1904); Novelli v. Carroll 420 A.2d 469, 472 (Pa. 
Super. 1980). During the proceedings below and prior to the Court's ruling on summary judgment, 
the Utah Legislature adopted legislation which codified this principle. See Utah Code Ann. §58-9-
602 (2002). Regardless, Judge Beacham ignored the husband/wife relationship in his summary 
judgment opinion and rather focused on a maternal relationship which, based upon Appellee's own 
testimony, was both tenuous and strained. By way of example, in the six month's of decedent's life, 
he saw his mother once and then merely to facilitate Appellee a few hours' visit with her 
granddaughter. (T1195 at 10:6-14; 12:22-23). Furthermore, at the time ofthe marriage, the decedent, 
placed in charge of inviting his family to the wedding, purposely chose otherwise, and married at a 
church of his choice. (Supra at 10-11). Though burial, according to LDS dictates as Appellee 
understood them was important to Appellee, Appellee admitted that decedent had long ceased his 
affiliation with the LDS Church. (Supra at 9-10). Consequently, it is incongruous in the instant case 
that the District Court, on summary judgment, would ignore the legally superior interests of a 
surviving spouse and rather extol Appellee's interest as being on equal or higher footing. This 
deference to the generic mother/son relationship is more than exacerbated by the mother' s concerted 
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efforts to ignore at all times her son's burial wishes based upon her own personal sensitivities and 
religious beliefs. Indeed, Appellee conceded throughout that she intended to give no weight or 
credibility whatsoever to her son's written desires. (Statement of Facts, ^['s 1-5, supra). 
Appellee successfully asserted before the lower Court that the case of In re Estate of Mover, 
577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978) barred disinterment of decedent. (R867). The Mover case, however, is 
clearly distinguishable from the present factual situation. In Mover, the executor of the will, at the 
time of burial, was fully aware of the decedent's contrary directives for disposal of his remains. Id. 
at 110. Indeed, the executor had the document in his possession and failed to timely object to the 
burial of the decedent. IcL Furthermore, the executor was not legally related to the decedent and 
only had that authority delegated to him under the will. See id. Clearly, the factual circumstances 
of Mover are hardly applicable here. Furthermore, as codified by Utah Code Ann. §58-9-601, et. 
seq., Utah statutory law, if Mover were applicable, would preempt the case law and give Appellant 
this right. See Hansen v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1337 (Utah 1982) (cited in Gotling 
v. PR Inc., 61 P.3d989, 991 (Utah2002)). Regardless, it is submitted that the factual circumstances 
of the Mover case hardly compare to the active deception by which Appellee concealed the 
decedent's wishes from Appellant herein. Appellant repeatedly stated that she would not have 
consented to the burial of her husband had his written request ill-advisedly entrusted to Appellee 
been communicated to Appellant. (Statement of Facts, *fl supra). 
ISSUE NO. VI 
In Entering Summary Judgment Against Appellant, the District Court 
Failed to Accept Appellant's Factual Statements as True and Draw 
All Inferences in Appellant's Favor 
In granting a summary judgment, the Appellate Court will affirm only when there is no 
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genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. See Rule 56(c) UtahR. Civ. P; Alder v. Bayer Corp. AGFA Div., 61 P.3d 1068,1075-76 (Utah 
2002); Abdulkadir v. Western Pac. R.R. Co.. 318 P.2d 339 (Utah J957). The District Court's ruling 
on cross-motions for summary judgment, docketed October 28,2003, prerequisite to the permanent 
injunction violates this premise. While recognizing that Appellant set forth an appropriate statement 
of facts in her reply memorandum the Court, nonetheless, accepted its facts "from Petitioner's 
[Appellee's] supporting memorandum". (R862). Significantly, however, on a motion for summary 
judgment, Appellant's facts must be accepted as true to support any ruling against her. In reference 
to the waiver of Appellant's rights, the Court found that Appellant's knowledge of the decedent's 
wishes was immaterial to the issue and oxymoronically stated that Appellant "cannot say that the 
purported contents of the note were a clear and unequivocal expression of Mr. Hughes' wishes". 
(R867). The Court then focuses on the decedent's oral recitations of his request to be cremated 
regarding which Appellant sought and was denied confirmation by Appellee. In the Court's opinion, 
by merely allowing the body to be buried in Utah, Appellant waived any right to choose another form 
of disposition, citing the In re Estate of Mover, 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978). (R867-68). The 
difficulty with the Court's recitation of the Mover case, however, is that waiver in the Mover case 
occurred when an executor was fully aware of a decedent's written request contained in a 
testamentary document. 578 P.2d at 110. In the instant case, after two days of trial, Judge Shumate 
clearly found that Appellee withheld the decedent's memorialized wishes from Appellant until 
sometime after decedent's burial in Utah. (R397). Again, Judge Shumate was the only trier of fact 
below. Judge Beacham reduced Shumate's factual recitations to the level of irrelevance. (R861). 
There is, however, in Shumate's May 19, 2003 ruling, no such indication. (Addendum at A2-A7; 
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R397-400). And, clearly Judge Shumate's order recites the evidence gleaned from the only testimony 
taken in the case. Id, That Judge Beacham, absent hearing, would choose to disregard Shumate's 
findings and Appellant's Affidavit and thereafter enter judgment against Appellant is, simply stated, 
contrary to the principles of summary judgment. See Abdulkadir v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 318 P .2d 
339 (Utah 1957). Thereafter, absent examining any prior testimony, Judge Beacham inferred that 
Appellant's relationship to her husband was somehow weaker than that of Appellee. Ultimately, in 
light of the decedent's memorialized directive, the District Court's following finding is simply 
untenable: "Mr. Hughes' expression of his wishes were contradictory at best, and his mental 
condition was not good at the time, so his true wishes cannot be determined with any certainty." 
(R869). The decedent's request for cremation is abundantly clear. (Addendum at Al). Appellee 
understood that request and actively concealed it from Appellant. (Supra at 5-7; 11-14). Appellant, 
even according to Judge Beacham, relied on the oral conversation with her husband, which Appellant 
initially discounted, and the contents of Mr. Hughes' note, which note confirmed the oral statements 
but remained unexamined by the Judge. (R864). Clearly, the file which the Judge indicates he 
reviewed is replete with copies of the note. (R860; R63, 255 at Exhibit 3, R414, 656, T1195 at 
Exhibit 1; and T1196 at Exhibit 1). 
Furthermore, the Court's ruling that Mr. Hughes' wishes could not be complied with due to 
New Mexico environmental law is also untenable. Appellant repeatedly took the position that she 
would honor the decedent's request as best as possible according to New Mexico law, and, thus, 
would scatter decedent's ashes as close to possible to Mr. Hughes' location of choice, a picnic area 
he had enjoyed with his daughter. 
Ultimately, rather than allocating the burden of establishing Rule 65A, Utah R. Civ. P.'s 
43 
prerequisite injunctive elements to Appellee, Judge Beacham shifted the burden of proof to 
Appellant to establish a compelling reason to honor her husband5 s request. In no part of the opinion, 
however, does the Judge provide any discussion of those elements of Rule 65A(e), Utah R. Civ. P. 
Simply stated, there are no findings whatsoever in the summary judgment that address the four 
conjunctive elements prerequisite to the issuance of a permanent injunction. 
Utah law requires Appellee to marshall evidence supporting all four conjunctive prerequisites 
to the issuance of an injunction. Absent a finding of irreparable harm or that the public interest 
would be adversely affected by the disinterment of the decedent, the injunction should not issue. See 
Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Searsv. 958 P.2d 228, 232-33 (Utah 1998; see also T1200 at 8-10). 
Ultimately, public interest is served by allowing decedents, even suicidal decedents, to have their 
burial wishes honored and to expect that a decedent's loved ones will honestly and openly 
communicate with one another. A decision placing the burden squarely upon Appellant to 
apparently prevent injunctive relief is ill-conceived and absent legal support. Indeed, in resisting the 
injunction, Appellant in the instant case is entitled to attorney's fees for this appeal. See, e.g.. Beard 
v. Dugdale, 741 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
This matter comes on appeal from a summary judgment granting Appellee equitable relief 
in the form of a permanent injunction. Appellant's husband and Appellee's son, took his own life 
in Albuquerque, New Mexico on February 27, 2002. The decedent left in the constructive 
possession of Appellee a partially holographic note directing cremation. Appellee, who felt her son's 
directive for his disposal proposed both an aesthetically unpleasing place for the scattering of his 
ashes and ran contrary to Appellee's notions of LDS burial practices, repeatedly advised Appellant 
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that the note contained no such directive. Appellee never considered honoring the decedent's 
directive. Concurrently, Appellee forbade her family from reading or discussing the note with 
Appellant. Under these circumstances, the decedent was buried in Utah on March 8, 2002. 
In late summer of 2002, Appellant obtained a copy of the note through the assistance of 
counsel. Upon reading its contents and after heartfelt reflection, Appellant came to Utah and sought 
the disinterment of her husband pursuant to Utah procedures and forms readily available through the 
Southwest Utah Public Health Department. Appellee sought to enjoin Appellant, stating that 
Appellant had waived this form of disposal. 
Trial was held in December of 2002, Judge James L. Shumate presiding, with the matter 
continued until April 15, 2003. On April 14, 2003 between 3:00 p.m. and 4:55 p.m., Appellee 
requested a continuance and ultimately filed a motion to disqualify Judge Shumate. Appellee, 
having procedurally unscheduled the April 15, 2003 trial setting pursuant to Rule 63, Utah R. Civ 
P., incongruously showed up at the courthouse. Appellee then implored the Judge to proceed, and, 
specifically seeking litigious advantage over Appellant, who had traveled with her witnesses from 
New Mexico and was but blocks away conferencing with her counsel, Appellee orally withdrew her 
motion to disqualify. Thereafter, on two occasions, Appellee requested dismissal of her case; Judge 
Shumate granted the dismissal. Within minutes, Appellee and her attorney were confronted by 
Appellant's counsel. Having viewed the minute entry of dismissal, Appellant specifically requested 
a copy of the proposed order of dismissal prior to its submission to the Court pursuant to Rule 4-
504(2), Utah R. Jud. Admin. Appellee, having been so advised, prepared an erroneous, contrary 
order granting her full injunctive relief and onerously submitted that unreviewed order to the Judge. 
This order was signed and filed on April 16, 2003 at 11:41 a.m. (See, inter alia, Addendum at A2-
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A7). Appellant received a signed copy of the erroneous order by mail the following day. 
Appellant moved for an order requiring conformity between the bench ruling and the 
erroneous written order prepared by Appellee. Appellee responded that her order represented the 
Judge's "real intent". Judge Shumate vigorously disagreed, but then concluded that his dismissal 
and Appellant's motion to conform were both moot once Appellee's motion to disqualify had been 
filed. Judge Shumate then recused himself. 
Appellant again moved the replacement judge to conform the erroneous order to one of 
dismissal contending that Appellant's earlier motion was not moot as Appellee's motion to 
disqualify had not divested Judge Shumate of his inherent jurisdiction. Appellee's response sought 
to argue her case's merits; Appellee never explained her attorney's "negligence" and/or egregious 
behavior. Appellee never filed a motion even seeking minimal relief from Judge Shumate's order 
of dismissal, procured at Appellee's request. 
Judge Beacham initially found for Appellant and struck that portion of Judge Shumate's 
order which declared that all actions untaken after April 14, 2003 at 4:55 p.m. were moot. 
Thereafter, however, Judge Beacham, on his own motion, sua sponte, inappropriately relieved 
Appellee of her dismissal. Subsequently, on cross-motions for summary judgment and without taking 
any testimony, Judge Beacham entered a global order of summary judgment, accepting Appellee's 
statement of facts and discounting decedent's written directive under circumstances of suicide. 
Ultimately, Judge Beacham's ruling endorsed the personal aesthetics and religious sensitivities of 
Appellee. And, rather than allocating the burden of establishing Rule 65, Utah. R. Civ. P.'s 
prerequisite injunctive elements to Appellee, Judge Beacham shifted the burden of proof to 
Appellant. 
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Judge Beacham's decision has drawn every inference against Appellant. The proceedings 
below mandate a dismissal of Appellee's case on multiple grounds. The Utah Supreme Court has 
addressed, but not resolved, the validity of a disqualified Judge's rulings. Madsen v. Prudential Fed. 
Sav. & Loan, 767 P.2d 538 (Utah 1988). Appellant submits that Judge Shumate's dismissal was 
valid under the prevailing law. Furthermore, considering Appellee's and her former counsel's 
egregious behavior, the doctrine of unclean hands should conclusively bar any equitable relief. 
Finally, where Appellee entrusted with decedent' s cremation request, withheld this information from 
Appellant, a conclusion that Appellant knowledgeably waived cremation of her husband's remains 
in March 2002 is untenable. Appellant should be allowed to proceed through the auspices of the 
Southwest Utah Public Health Department to disinter her husband, Appellee's aesthetic sensitivities 
and personal religious beliefs notwithstanding. These latter concerns are hardly the bulwark to 
establish an injunction. Ultimately, Appellant is entitled to attorney's fees in resisting this 
injunction. 
mfi DATED this /<yl/ day of August, 2004 
MICHAEL D. HUGHES, of 
HUGHES AND BURSELL 
Attorney for Appellant 
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I, Michael D. Hughes, certify that on August , 2004,1 served two cop les of the attached 
Brief of Appellant upon Kathleen McConkie, the counsel for the Appellee in this matter, by mailing 
the same, via first class mail, postage prepaid, at the following address: 
Kathleen McConkie 
150 North Main Street 
Suite 202 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Michael D. Hughes 




Mom you and Dad please take Debbie and Craig on a trip Europe ASAP. I don't 
want to have any kind of funeral I would like to cremated ASAP and have my 
remains put in the Rio Grande at paseo bridge please. Also buy Holly a play 
station 2 with every game she wants. You should use the signed bills of sale and 
buy and pay off the gray truck for dad and buy your self a new STS Cadillac.. 
Please talk to someone about setting up a trust account for Holly. I need you to 
deposit $3900.00 in to wells Fargo account number 6377002347 and pay $5189.63 
to Suburban Mortgage use the enclosed payment coupons 
Leslie and her Mom & Dad have been very very good to me. John loaned me 
$22,000.00 and all I gave for collateral was the big white truck at my insistence 
that he have something. Leslie has also loaned about $20,000.001 have quit 
claimed my interest in the beck and bella vista homes. Because I love her so much 
and want her to be safe and secure so I would like it if its possible I would like you 
to buy beck & balcon homes for what is owed on them and put in a trust for holly 
then give Leslie 1500.00 per mo. For two years to so she quit working in los lunas. 
If you buy the homes sell on contracts that can't be transferred or assximed when the renters move 
out. 
I LOVE YOU I'M SORRY THAT THIS WILL HURT YOU AND OTHERS BUT I WILL BE 
MUCH HAPPIER THIS WAY AS WILL OTHER PEOPLE AROUND ME. 
a^?^ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
LN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE iQFOT&H 
DEANNA PUGH, j 
Petitioner, i 
vs. 
LESLIE DOZZO-OTERO, MARTY 
GBLCREASE STROMAN, CITY OF ST. 
GEORGE, TERRY SCHRAMM, ST. 
GEORGE CEMETERY SERVICE AND 
SOUTHWEST UTAH PUBLIC HEALTH 
DEPARTMENT, 
Respondents. 
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RULING ON RULE 59(e) 
MOTION 
TO ALTER OR 
AMEND JUDGMENT 
i CASE NO. 020502154 
j Judge James L. Shumate 
This matter comes on before the Court on a Rule 59 Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
filed on April 24, 2003 by Respondents to the case. Petitioner filed a response on April 30, 
2003. Th6-Motion was filed in response to a hearing on April 15, 2003 wherein Petitioner orally 
entered a motion to dismiss the case after Respondents failed to make a timely appearance. 
BACKGROUND 
Respondent, Leslie Dozzo-Hughes married Curtis Hughes in March 2001 in New 
Mexico. On February 27, 2002, Curtis Hughes died in Albuquerque, New Mexico. A funeral 
service was held in Albuquerque, New Mexico, followed by a service and burial in St. George, 
Utah. Sometime following the burial, Respondent became aware of Mr. Hughes' desire to be 
cremated and have his ashes scattered from a bridge spanning the Rio Grande River. On 
November 1, 2002, Respondent contacted the Sexton of the St. George Cemetery to request that 
the body of Curtis Hughes be disinterred to fulfill his final wish. 
On November 5,2002, Petitioner, Deanna Pugh, mother of Curtis Hughes, filed an Ex 
Parte Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order to prevent Respondent from disinterring Mr. 
Hughes5 body. The Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order was issued and a hearing 
on the matter was scheduled. On December 16-17, 2002, the Court heard arguments on the issue 
of the Temporary Restraining Order. After hearing from the parties, the Court continued the 
matter without date to allow the parties to attempt to reach an amicable settlement. 
The parties were unable to reach a settlement and another hearing was requested. Due to 
mutual agreement of the parties, the hearing was continued until April 15, 2003. On April 11, 
2003, William Bernard, new counsel for Petitioner, made an appearance for the Court. On April 
14, 2003, a Motion for Recusal was submitted by Petitioner. 
On April 15, 2003, the previously scheduled hearing on the Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order was held. Respondent was not present at the time of the hearing. As 
Respondent was not present, Petitioner withdrew the Motion for Recusal and requested that the 
case be dismissed, "for failure to prosecute." The Court granted Petitioner's oral Motion to 
Dismiss the case and the matter was dismissed. The following day, Petitioner filed an "Order 
Granting Permanent Injunction." 
ANALYSIS 
This Rule 59 Motion emanates from a hearing fraught with missteps and 
misunderstandings. Instead of an amicable resolution of the parties' differences, petitioner's 
counsel seems to attempt to use the rules to play "hard ball" to reach a result favorable to his 
client. The result of this attitude is an outcome that does not serve the petitioner based upon 
petitioner's attorney repeated failure to adequately perform his duty. 
The pursuit of a resolution in this case has been handled in a clumsy manner since 
petitioner's new counsel has made an appearance on April 11, 2003 Notwithstanding the 
purported statements and threats made by counsel to the parties, there has been a general failure 
to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of J idicial Administration. 
On April 14, 2003, Petitioner filed a Rule 63 Motion to recuse Judge Shumate at 4:55 
p.m. A copy of the Motion was purported to have been provided to counsel for respondent via 
mail. On April 15, 2003, Petitioner attended the scheduled hearing at which respondent was not 
present. During the course of the hearing, the Court suggested that the hearing be postponed to 
allow for the Rule 63 motion to be heard. Instead, petitioner withdrew the Rule 63 motion and 
orally submitted Ma motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute." The motion was granted and the 
Court requested that the pleadings be submitted for signature. 
On April 16, 2003, petitioner submitted an "Order Granting Permanent Injunction." Rule 
4-504(2) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration requires that a copy of any proposed 
finding, judgment or order be served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court. 
Counsel for respondent states in their affidavit that they did not receive any notification of the 
proposed order prior to it's submission to the court. 
In response to the erroneous order, respondent filed this Rule 59 Motion to Amend. It 
was accompanied by a memorandum in support of the Motion. In response, on April 30, 2003, 
petitioner filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Amend. However, petitioner's 
response fails to address any of the arguments surrounding the Rule 59 Motion. Instead, 
petitioner seems to attempt to argue the merits of the case itself. This is clearly an inadequate 
response to the Rule 59 Motion. 
Rule 63 Motion Required t o be Heard Prior to any Subsequent Hearings 
On April 14, 2003, Petitioner filed a Rule 63 Motion for Recusal with the Court. Rule 63 
A4 
allows for the disqualification of a judge on the motion of one of the parties. In the event of a 
party filing a Motion for Recusal, Rule 63(b)(2) requires the hearing judge to "enter an order 
granting the motion or certifying the motion and affidavit to a reviewing judge." Rule 63 
requires that no other action be taken on the case until the motion for recusal has been properly 
heard. 
The Utah Court of Appeals explained the procedure required by Rule 63 in the case of 
Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679(1994). The court explained that once a party or counsel files 
an affidavit charging a judge with prejudice or bias toward the party or counsel, the judge has 
two courses of action. 
"First, if the point made in the affidavit is well-taken, the judge can simply recuse 
himself and transfer responsibility for the case to another judge. Alternatively, if the 
judge 'questions the legal sufficiency' of the affidavit and accordingly believes recusal 
may be unnecessary, then he can refer the affidavit to another judge to determine whether 
there is sufficient rationale in the affidavit to prompt recusal. No other option is 
available under the rule" 
Barnard, 882 P.2d at 682. Italics added. As explained by the Court at the hearing, once the Rule 
63 motion had been entered by counsel, the proper course of action is to have the case transferred 
to another judge to be heard or to grant the motion based upon the claims made in the affidavit. 
The actions of the parties and Court following the April 14, 2003 filing of the Rule 63 
motion are rendered moot as a result of the filing. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah 
case law both require all action subsequent to the filing of a Rule 63 motion to be stopped. Any 
action taken regardless of this rule is invalid. As such, the Order Granting Permanent Injunction 
filed on April 16, 2003 is vacated. All subsequent filings that pertain to the Order Granting 
Permanent Injunction are rendered moot. The Hearing on the Motion for Recusal of May 21, 
2003, is also vacated as the Motion for Recusal is granted. 
7V K 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this / / day of May 2003. 
JAMES L. &TUMATE, District Court Judge 
&6 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this ft day of May 2003,1 mailed true and correct copies of 
the above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following: 
William L. Bernard 
Attorney for Petitioner 
510 South Main Street 
Suite B-8 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Michael D.Hughes 
William 0. Kimball 
Hughes & Bursell 
Attorneys for Respondent 
187 North 100 West 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Terry Schamm 
Sexton of the St. George City Cemetery 
700 East Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Eric Ludlow 
Washington County Attorney 
192 East 200 North 
Suite 200 
St. George, Utah 84770 c 
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Deputy Court Clerk 
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IN THE FffTH DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA PUGEL ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) RULING ON MOTIONS FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. ) Civil No. 020502154 
) Judge G. Rand Beacham 
LESLIE DOZZO-HUGHES, et al, ) 
) 
Respondents.) 
This matter came before the Court pursuant to motions for summary judgment filed 
by Petitioner Deanna Pugh (hereafter "Petitioner") and Respondent Leslie Dozzo-Hughes 
(hereafter "Respondent"). The Court heard oral arguments at a hearing on September 9, 
2003, and instructed the parties thereafter to submit courtesy copies of their memoranda and 
affidavits, copies of relevant case law, and a notice to submit for decision. Having read the 
memoranda, statutes and case law, having heard the arguments, and having reviewed the file 
for this action, the Court rules as follows: 
COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 4-501 
Respondent's motion was filed first. The "Statement of Facts" of Respondent's 
supporting memorandum cites only one source: Portions of the "Background55 section of 
Judge Shumate's May 19,2003 "Ruling onRule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment55 
Although Respondent treats the '"Background55 section as if it consisted of findings of fact 
that is inconect The "Background" section appears to this Court to be simply a recitation 
of the allegations relevant to the issues raised by the pleadings. It is particularly telling that 
the "Background" statements upon which Respondent relies are irrelevant to Judge 
Shumate's actual ruling that the Order Granting Permanent Injunction was vacated. 
Consequently, Respondent's motion for summary judgment lacks a sufficient factual basis. 
Petitioner's motion for summary judgment is supported by a memorandum with a 
"Statement of Facts" in proper form and with clear references to the record of this case.-
Petitioner has complied with Rule 4-501 for a supporting memorandum. Petitioner also 
styled her memorandum as one opposing Respondent's motion, however, and in this regard 
it fails to meet the requirements of Rule 4-501} If Respondent's memorandum had complied 
with the rule, Respondent's statements of fact would have been deemed admitted for 
purposes of summary judgment See, e.g., Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291. 
Respondent's memorandum in opposition to Petitioner's motion did identify the 
paragraphs of Petitioner's statement of facts which Respondent disputes. Respondent's 
original formal error was corrected in her post-hearing reply memorandum. The specific 
disputes identified in Respondent's memorandum, however, consist mainly of argument and 
immaterial facts and are not sufficient to raise any particular genuine issue of material fact. 
1This is a common problem when parties file competing motions for summary judgment. la an 
effort to be efficient the parties file dual-purpose memoranda which, in spite of best intentions, are 
inevitably inadequate for one purpose or the other. This Court cannot recall ever seeing a memorandum 
which adequately constituted both a supporting memorandum and an opposing memorandum. 
Petitioner's reply memorandum correctly notes many of these deficiencies. 
As a result, the facts which this Court finds to have been adequately presented are 
taken primarily from Petitioner's supporting memorandum, with some additions from 
Respondent's reply memorandum. 
FACTS 
Some of the facts asserted by the parties, and properly supported, are irrelevant to the 
Court's decision; for example, the Court finds no relevance in the fact that each party paid 
for the services of the mortuary hired by that party. The Court finds that the following 
relevant and material facts have been established without genuine issue: 
1. Petitioner is the mother of Mr. Curtis Hughes, who died on February 28,2002 
in Albuquerque, New Mexico of cyanide poisoning, an apparent suicide. 
2. Respondent is the survivmg spouse of Mr. Hughes, and had been married to 
him about 11 months before his death.2 
3. On February 12, 2002, Mr. Hughes left a voice mail message for Respondent 
in which he said he was going to kill himself and that he would like to be cremated and have 
his ashes spread over the Rio Grande River. 
4. Mr. Hughes phoned Respondent again about a half hour later, and stated that 
2There was a suggestion in the arguments that Respondent and Mr. Hughes were separated and not 
on good terms at the time of his death, but neither party's memorandum established such facts. 
A i n 
he did not mean what he said; Respondent, who is a mental health professional,3 interpreted 
Mr. Hughes's two phone calls to he cca ploy to get attention," such as she commonly 
encounters in her profession. 
5. After Mr. Hughes's death on February 28, 2002, Respondent hired French's 
Mortuary to receive the body from the Medical Examiner's Office in Albuquerque. On 
about March 2, 2002, French's Mortuary took charge of the body under Respondent's 
instructions to prepare the body and have a faneral service for Mr. Hughes in Albuquerque. 
6. At about the same time, Petitioner hired Metcalf Mortuary to transport the 
body from Albuquerque to St. George, Utah for a second funeral service and the interment 
in a burial plot there. Respondent consented to the Utah funeral and interment. 
7. A funeral service was held in Albuquerque on March 5, 2002, after which 
Respondent allowed the body to be taken to Utah by Metcalf Mortuary for the second funeral 
service and burial, which were conducted on March 8, 2002 and were attended by 
Respondent. Respondent gave no indication that she thought the burial in Utah was to be 
temporary. 
8. At the time of his death, Mr. Hughes apparently left a note for Petitioner, 
making some reference to being cremated and having his ashes spread over the Rio Grande 
^Neither party's statement of facts covers this fact but the Court has gathered this from their 
discussion. 
River in accordance with his voice mail message to Respondent4 
ANALYSIS 
Respondent seeks the Court's order allowing her to have the body disinterred and 
transportedback to New Mexico for cremation, asserting thai she is certain that this was Mr. 
Hughes' s wish. Respondent apparently relies upon Mr Hughes' s voice mail message, which 
she did not believe at the time, and upon Mr. Hughes's note, the contents of which are not 
in evidence before the Court. 
1. Funeral Services Licensing Act 
Respondent argues that she alone is entitled to determine whether the body will be 
disinterred, under the authority of Utah Code Ann. §58-9-602. This statutory provision is 
part of the current version of the Funeral Services Licensing Act (hereafter the "Act") which 
first became effective May 5, 2003, more than one year after the subject burial, and it now 
sets the priorities of persons who are vested with the c right and duty to control the 
disposition of a deceased person.55 The earlier version of the Act, which was effective at the 
time of the subject burial, had no comparable provision. 
Respondent argues that the new provisions of the Act should be applied retroactively, 
but the Act does not so provide In the absence of an express declaration of retroactivity, 
4The parties disagree about when Respondent first saw the note, but the Court finds this to be 
immaterial to the Court's decision, la fact, neither party has given the Court a copy of the note or the 
detais of its contents 
statutes are not to be applied retroactively. Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3. Furthermore, the 
Court knows of no basis for concluding that the absence of a comparable provision in the 
former Act evinces a legislative intention that the new Act be applied retroactively. 
Consequently, Respondent's argument is not persuasive. 
Furthermore, the Court is not persuaded that Section 602 of the Act would be 
controlling in this case even if it applied retroactively. Section 602 specifically controls the 
"right and duty to control the disposition of a deceased person/7 "Disposition" is defined in 
the Act as "the final disposal of a dead human body" by any of six specific means or "other 
lawful means." Utah Code Ann. §58-9-102(7). Both "earth interment" and "cremation" are 
defined as means of "disposition," but nothing in the Act indicates that Section 602 gives any 
person a continuing or perpetual right to choose more than one disposition of one body. 
Consequently, the Court is not persuaded that the serial dispositions sought by Respondent 
are authorized by the Act, even in its current form. 
2. New Mexico Law. 
Respondent argues that the Court should apply the law of New Mexico to determine 
that she has a right to disinter the body from Utah and dispose of it in New Mexico. The 
argument that New Mexico law gave Respondent rights to the original disposition of the 
body would likely have been correct if made before the body was interred in Utah, but now 
it is too late. The issue is no longer whether Respondent had such rights regarding 
disposition. The issue is whether Respondent can now obtain permission for disinterment 
from a grave in Utah, and Utah clearly has the most significant relationship to that issue. 
Disinterment of a body from a grave in Utah is a matter for Utab law. See, e. g., Utah Code 
Ann. §26-2-17, §26-4-12, and §76-9-704. 
3. Waiver of Respondent's Rights. 
Petitioner argues that Respondent waived any right to dispose of the body by 
cremation when she agreed to the burial in Utah. Respondent counters that she was not 
aware of Mr. Hughes's wisbes until she learned of his note to Petitioner. Petitioner argues 
that Respondent saw the note before the burial, and Respondent argues that sbe did not. The 
Court finds this to be immaterial. 
Whatever the contents of the note may be, Respondent has not given evidence that the 
note creates a binding, enforceable legal obligation to accomplish a cremation. Regardless 
of when Respondent learned of Mr. Hughes's note to Petitioner, the note does not create a 
legal right in Respondent which she did not already have, if aay. The note constitutes simply 
(i) another expression of Mr. Hughes's wishes, contrary to his last expression to Respondent, 
and (ii) Respondent's explanation for her cbange of mind about the burial, which the Court 
finds to be a good faith explanation.5 Furthermore, considering Mr. Hughes' s vacillation as 
Respondent has not explained, however, why sbe now chooses to beheve the note over Mr 
Hughes's statement to her that he did not mean what he had said in his voice mail, or why she should rely-
to any extent on the statements of a person whose mental condition had obviously deteriorated to the point 
of suicide 
to his wishes, Respondent cannot say that the purported contents of the note were a clear and 
•unequivocal expression of Mr. Hughes's wishes. Consequently, the note is not material to 
the Court's decision. 
The fact remains that Mr. Hughes informed Respondent of his wish to be cremated 
before his death, and Respondent, in apparent good faith, either chose not to believe him or 
chose not to comply with his wishes. Respondent could have chosen to have the body 
cremated in accordance with the wishes Mr. Hughes once expressed to her. Having chosen 
to allow the body to be buried in Utah, instead of being cremated and disposed of in New 
Mexico, Respondent waived any right to choose another form of disposition. Cf. In re Estate 
of Mover. 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978). 
4. Public Policy Regarding Disinterment 
The case just cited states: cTt is therefore a sound and well-established policy of the 
law that a person, once buried, should not be exhumed except for the most compelling of 
reasons." IcL at 110-111. This Court does not read the new provisions of the Funeral 
Services Licensing Act to change that policy, since the Act only establishes the priorities of 
persons who may chose the method of disposition of a body. 
The Mover case was preceded by Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial 
Commission. 115 Utah 336, 204 P.2d 811 (Utah 1949), in which the Utah Supreme Court 
quoted with approval the following policy language from a Corpus Juris Secondum article: 
There is a distinction between the rights existing prior to burial and those after 
burial, because after its interment the body is hi the custody of the law and a 
disturbance of its resting place and its removal is subject to the control and 
direction of a court of equity in any case properly before it. It is the policy of 
the law, except in cases of necessity or for laudable purposes, that the sanctity 
of the grave should be maintained, and that a body once suitably buried should 
remain undisturbed; and a court will not ordinarily order or permit a body to 
be disinterred unless there is a strong showing that it is necessary and that the 
interests of justice require it. However, there is no universal rule applicable, 
each, case depending on its own facts and circumstances; and for a valid 
reason, upon application by a proper person, the removal of a body will be 
permitted. 
Id. at 813 (emphasis added). 
The Mover case was relied upon by the Court of Appeals of Ohio in Spanich v. 
Reichelderfer, 628 N.E. 2d 102 (Ohio App. 1993), and that court's expression of the reasons 
for the policy restricting disinterments is powerfully persuasive on this issue. The opinion 
examines the several factors which courts have considered with respect to requests for 
disinterment of bodies, and this Court has considered those factors in relation to this case and 
finds them generally to support Petitioner's arguments. For example, the Court has 
considered the following: 
a. While Respondent had the closest legal relationship to Mr. Hughes, It is 
suggested (without contradiction) that they were separated at the time of his death, so her 
personal interest is weaker than it might have been. 
b. Petitioner's relationship to Mr. Hughes is the closest recognized in the law, 
except that of a surviving spouse. 
A16 
c. Mr. Hughes's expressions of his wishes were contradictory at best, and his 
mental condition was not good at the time, so his true wishes cannot be determined with any 
certainty. 
d. Respondent consented to the burial in Utah, and her suggestion that she was 
under pressure from Petitioner is not supported by evidence before the Court. 
e. Respondent acknowledges that she cannot folly comply with what she 
considers Mr". Hughes's wishes even if the body is disinterred and cremated, because laws 
governing the Rio Grande River would prevent her from spreading the ashes there. 
Ultimately, this Courtis not persuaded that Respondent has identified any compelling 
reason to order Mr. Hughes's body disinterred. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no genuine issue of material fact, and Petitioner is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Petitioner's motion for summary judgment is granted and Respondent's 
motion for summary judgment is denied. Accordingly, a permanent injunction shall be 
issued, enjoining the disinterment of the body. Petitioner's counsel is hereby directed to 
submit an appropriate judgment and permanent injunction pursuant to Rule 4-504. A copy 
of this Ruling shall be attached to the judgment and incorporated therein by reference. 
Dated this ^% day of October, 2003. 
G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
The* Leavitts first argue the trial court erred in granting 
the County's summary judgment motion regarding their inverse 
condemnation claim. Under article I, section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution, "an inverse condemnation action requires (1) 
property, (2) a taking or damages, and (3) a public use." 
Farmers &ew World Life Ins, Co, v. Bountiful Cityf 803 P.2d 1241, 
1244 (Utah 1990) . Under the public use prong, the Leavitts must 
show that any alleged damages were "anticipated prior to the 
condemnation and [were] an unavoidable consequence" of the 
governmental activity at issue. Id. at 1245- Our review of the 
record shows no evidence that the Leavitts' alleged injuries 
"were unavoidable or necessary to" the County's spraying 
activities in this case. Id,, at 1246. We thus conclude the 
trial court correctly granted the County's summary judgment 
motion. See id 
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The Leavitts next contend the trial court erred in denying 
as moot their m o m o n to amend their complaint to add a nuisance 
claim. A case is moot " [1]f the requested judicial relief cannot 
affect the rights of the litigants." Pur an v. Morris, 635 P. 2d 
43, 45 (Utah 13 81} . Here, the relief requested could have 
affected the litigants7 rights. Although the County had already-
filed its summary judgment morion at the time the Leavitts moved 
to amend their complaint, the trial court still had discretion to 
allow or disallow the LeavittsT motion to amend their complaint, 
gee Utah R, Civ. P. 15(a); Swift Stop, Inc. v Wight
 r 845 P.2d 
250, 253-54 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (affirming trial court's 
exercise of discretion m denying plaintiff 7s motion to amend 
filed after defendant moved for summary judgment) ; cf. 3 James W. 
Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 15.12[3] (1397) (stating 
" [w] hether a court grants leave to amend after a defendant files 
a motion for summary judgment is often based on such factors as 
the timing of the amendment and the theories and legal issues 
presented" and that "leave to amend after a final summary 
judgment" is even allowed in some "limited circumstances" 
(emphasis added)); 6 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 1488 (2d ed. 1990) (stating under federal rule 
that "courts have TIOT: imposed any arbitrary timing restrictions 
on a party's request for leave to amend and permission has been 
granted under Rule 15(a) at various stages of the litigation: 
following discovery; after a pretrial conference; at a hearing on 
a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment; after a motion to 
dismiss has been granted but before the order of dismissal has 
been entered") . If the trial court had allowed the Leavitts to 
amend, their suit against the County would have stayed alive, and 
they could have further pursued their nuisance claim. We thus 
conclude the trial court incorrectly dismissed as moot the 
Leavitts'.1 motion to amend their complaint. 
Therefore, similar to the trial court in Timm v. Dewsnup, 
851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993) , the trial court here "did not exercise 
its discretion because it took the position that the [] claim was 
no longer before it and subject to amendment." Id. at 1182. We 
must' theq. "remand this case to the trial court to address the 
merits of the motion to amend so that the court may exercise its 
discretion with regard to it." Id. 
On remand, the trial court should consider the following 
factors: "(1} the timeliness of the motion; (2) the 
justification given by the movant for the delay; and (3) the 
resulting prejudice to the responding party." Kleinert v. 
Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
As part of this analysis, the trial court may consider the 
following factors specifically relevant to this type of case: 
(1) "[u]ntimely filing of the amendment after the defendant files 
a motion for summary judgment"; (2) " [f ] utility of the proposed 
971300-CA 2 
additional claims"; (3) "[w]hether the interest in finality of 
litigation is outweighed by the policy of liberally allowing a 
party a fair opportunity to present a case"; (4) " [f ] ailure to 
provide a valid reason for not presenting the new theory 
earlier11; and (5) " [a] vailability of facts to plaintiff to 
support a new theory before the entry of a final summary 
judgment." 3 Moore, sunra, at § 15.12[3]. 
Accordingly, we affirm m part and reverse and remand in 
part. 
Noa&ian H. Jacksog^r J u d g e 
WE CONCUR: 
fRussell W. Bench, Judge U. 
T. Greenwood, Judge 
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LILLARD, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, 
in which HIGHERS and FARMER, JJ., joined. 
OPINION 
LILLARD. 
*1 This is a will contest. The decedent committed 
suicide after writing several notes in which he 
expressed his wish that the bulk of his estate pass to 
his wife of eighteen years, with specific bequests to 
his children. The decedent's children contested the 
validity of the disposition, arguing that the decedent 
lacked testamentary capacity to execute a will at the 
time that he wrote the notes. After a jury trial, the 
jury found that the decedent had testamentary 
capacity and that the handwritten notes constituted a 
valid holographic will. The children appeal, arguing 
that the burden of proving testamentary capacity 
should have been placed on the will's proponents, 
due to the decedent's depression and resulting 
suicide, and that the evidence did not support the 
jury's verdict. We affirm, finding that the trial court 
did not err in its instructions on the burden of proof 
and that there is material evidence to support the 
jury's verdict. 
This is a tragic case involving the contest of a 
holographic will. On April 28, 1996, 
fifty-six-year-old W.O. Mcintyre ("Mcintyre") 
committed suicide. He was survived by his wife of 
eighteen years, Jane Mcintyre ("Mrs.McIntyre"), 
and two grown children from a previous marriage, 
daughter Teresa Burns ("Teresa") and son Stacey 
Keith Mcintyre ("Keith"). Prior to his death, 
Mcintyre was in a state of extreme depression, 
stemming in part from his relatively recent 
diagnosis of diabetes, and the resulting fear that his 
health would worsen and leave him a burden to his 
family. 
Prior to Mcintyre's death, he wrote three 
handwritten suicides notes. The notes, dated March 
3, March 13, and April 27, 1996, were entitled "W. 
O. Mcintyre Last Wishes Will and Notes." In 
them, Mcintyre expressed his wish that everything 
he owned go to his widow, with the exception of a 
$25,000 bequest each to his son and daughter. Mrs. 
Mcintyre offered the notes to the probate court as 
her husband's holographic will. 
On June 6, 1996, an order was issued admitting the 
holographic will to probate, and appointing Mike 
Browder ("Browder"), Mcintyre1 s nephew, as 
administrator of the estate. On September 10, 1996, 
Mcintyre's grown children, Teresa and Keith 
("Contestants") filed a lawsuit to contest the will 
against Mrs. Mcintyre and Browder 
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("Proponents"). In the lawsuit, they asserted that 
their father was incompetent to make a valid will at 
the time he wrote the suicide notes. The Proponents 
filed an answer denying that the decedent lacked 
testamentary capacity. 
Trial was held before a jury on March 23 and 24, 
1998. Mrs. Mclntyre testified that the document 
which had been tendered to the probate court as her 
husband's last will and testament consisted of three 
notes written on three separate dates. Her husband 
had shown her the first note shortly after he wrote it 
on March 3, 1996. She found the second note on the 
morning of March 14, 1996. At her husband's 
request, she placed the first two notes in the top 
drawer of their bedroom chest of drawers. The last 
note was left by her husband on the dining room 
table on the day that he committed suicide. She 
testified that she was positive that the three notes 
were entirely in Mclntyre*s handwriting. 
*2 Mrs. Mclntyre testified that her husband had 
been diagnosed with diabetes a couple of years 
before his death, and that the diagnosis upset him 
considerably. Although his diabetes could be 
controlled by pills, Mclntyre worried about 
eventually becoming an invalid. Mrs. Mclntyre 
testified that in the six months or so preceding her 
husband's suicide, his behavior changed 
remarkably. She said that he began to sleep a lot 
during the day, spend less time with his family, and 
was not as physically active as he previously had 
been. 
Mrs. Mclntyre testified that on March 1, 1996, 
Mclntyre came home early from his job as a river 
boat captain because he was so depressed that he 
felt incapable of captaining the boat. At his 
employer's insistence, Mclntyre talked to a 
counselor, Linda Laney ("Laney"), about his 
depression. He met with Laney twice, on March 7, 
1996, and again on March 8, 1996. On March 13, 
1996, Mrs. Mclntyre met with Laney and told her 
that she was afraid to leave her husband alone, for 
fear that he would commit suicide. Laney 
recommended that Mclntyre be hospitalized for 
treatment of his depression, and she scheduled an 
"intervention" for the next morning, March 14. On 
the morning of the intervention, Mrs. Mclntyre 
found Mclntyre's second suicide note, dated March 
13, 1996. Mclntyre was hospitalized later that day. 
Shortly after he was released from the hospital, 
Mclntyre relumed to work. He had requested, and 
received, a demotion from captain to pilot. 
However, on Friday, April 26, tie again left the boat 
early to return home. Mrs. Mclntyre testified that 
Mclntyre committed suicide on Sunday, April 28, 
while she was away from home. When she came 
home that day, she found the last suicide note, dated 
Saturday, April 27. In her testimony, Mrs. Mclntyre 
expressed her opinion that Mclntyre, although 
clearly depressed, was of sound mind when he 
wrote the three suicide notes. 
Browder, Mclntyre's nephew and the 
administrator of his estate, testified that he was 
familiar with his uncle's handwriting and that the 
holographic will was written entirely in his uncle's 
handwriting. Browder investigated Mclntyre's 
assets and found they were essentially the same as 
those listed m the notes. Upon request, Browder 
read the notes aloud to the jury. 
The second note began at the end of the first note, 
on the same paper. The first two notes, together, 
read: 
Sunday March 3rd 96 
W.O. Mclntyre Last Wishes Will + Notes 
To All that 1 Leave Behind 
Dieing [sic] is part of living and it comes to us 
one and all. To me it is not such a big deal, and to 
me in my present state of mind it would be a 
releif [sic]. [ have talked and told Jane all about it 
and it is a heavy Burden almost more than I can 
bear. To those that I leave behind do not greive 
[sic] for me because if I am no more I am releived 
[sic] of my pain and mental anguish + turmoil. 
As all of you know I am a diabetic and there is no 
cure for that only control. Also I have seen other 
people get old and become invalids + not be able 
to take care of themselves—and be dependant on 
family-hospitals-nursing homes and I do not 
want that for myself, and Also the expenses of a 
serious sickness, can completely wipe out a 
family's money. + savings. 
*3 Teresa and Family—Keith and Family 
I have been having suicidal thoughts and if I do 
this (take my own life) I want Jane to have 
everything that I leave behind. Because she is the 
one that will be affected and hurt the most. And 
has been a dear + understanding partner in life. 
Also she will need it all-to continue her life and 
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if there is any left at her time of passing. I want 
you all to have your share. Please be good to Jane 
+ help her any way that you can. 
To all the rest of my family 
Lorena + Bobby + Sherry + Christie 
Mike + Janet + kids 
Marie + Shawn. Vicky-Ricky 
When you think of me think of our past good 
years and the good times that we all had in years 
past. I do when I reflect back. 
Mike a note to you. You have been one of the 
best relatives as a friend + as a 
person-truthful~honest~and dependable as 
anyone can be. You have helped me immensely in 
the sale of items and I hope that I always made it 
worth your while. I hope that you will continue to 
be that kind of a person. It is a great asset as there 
are not a lot of people like you that I know. 
Jane my Dearest wife I love you and am so sorry 
for even thinking these thoughts much less doing 
them. If my body is found + I'm sure it will be 
please have my remains cremated and no funeral. 
I want no one to feel sorry or bear remorse for 
me-A few will-you the most-and let life go on 
as if I were on the boat. 
March 13th 96--Jane I have given this constant 
thought and there seems like there is no way 
out--no releif [sic] other than to go on to the 
maker. I am so very sorry that my life ended this 
way. Please let your life go on + do not greive 
[sic] too much for me. It seems like it was the 
only thing that I could do to end my personal 
hurt. 
Jane our investments with H.J. Maxedon are as 
follows 8 of them. 
1. Investment Company of America 
2. Income Fund of America 
3. AMCAP Fund 
4. R.I.C. Reality Investment Co. 
5. New Economy Fund 
6. Smallcap World Fund 
7. Europacific Growth Fund 










Jane, our investments with Little A Aron Forsyth 
he works now or did take over his dads business 
at Forsyth motors + used car cases in Corinth 
there across from Wrotens Hardware ( + his 
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W.O. Mclntyre Pioneer II Account No. 002-0964062547 
Latest Ammount [sic] shown on paperwork 
WOMC Pioneer II(IRA) Account No. 002-9200326488 
Latest Ammount [sic] shown on paperwork 
Jane Mclntyre Pioneer II(IRA) 
77,110.44 
16,596.14 
Latest Ammount [sic] shown on paperwork 16,467 53 
W.O. + Mary Jane Mclntyre—American Capital Comstock Fund A 
$ Ammount [sic] 9,519.28 
Appx Total 119,692.00 
Also Jane there is a company 4 01 K plan which ammounts 
[sic]according to the last paperwork 
Savings Bonds m a safety deposit box in Selmer + some 
m the green metal box here at home which should 
ammount [sic] to 25 or 30,000 
Also $60,000 plus m the bank 
Totals 
Aron Forsyth + sister (9) Morris 
Company 4 01 K plan 
Savings Bonds Estimated 









4 4 9 , 9 9 9 , 
00 
00 
*4 Jane I love you and am so very sorry for what 
I have done-But the dollar did not make me 
happy Please use the monies + possessions that I 
leave behind wisely + maby [sic] it will carry 
you through 
Please tell Raymond Hopkins Royce Wilkins + 
Martha Floyd that they are good people + good 
friends and that my thoughts of them were the 
very best 
Teresa Clay + Ricky I love all of you very much 
and am so glad that you are domg well I hope 
you won't miss me much -Life goes on no matter 
what happens And I know that you will make the 
best of it I am leavmg everything to Jane because 
she will be hurt the worst and will need just about 
all to continue her life Stay m Church and 
beleive [sic] and as you know thmgs will go 
better 
Keith + Laurie-I love you also and am very 
proud of you Keep up the good work and I wish 
you a healthy boy or girl Remember me in my 
better days 
To all Relatives Fnends Please do no greive [sic] 
or feel sorry for me I feel like I will be out of my 
misery + troubles Good by to all + remember me 
m my younger + better days 
And last to Jane~I love you with all my heart I 
do not know what has happened to me other than 
I dread daylight ever [sic] day + seeing the sun 
come up for another day So therefore life is not a 
pleasure for me and it cannot be for you I beleive 
[sic] that I will be forgiven for taking my own life 
and will see you m heaven I do not believe it is 
God's will that a person should suffer like I have 
recently Please forgive me for what I have done 
and think of our good years together 
I love you Jane 
Always have + 
Always will 
Copr © West 2004 No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works 
Not Reported in S.W.3d Page 5 
2000 WL 33191354 (Tenn.Ct.App.) 
(Cite as: 2000 WL 33191354 (Tenn.CtApp.)) 
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The last note, dated April 27, 1996, reads: 
I hope you saved my other notes + wishes—I can't 
find them. 
Sat April 27th Ptf-Jane things did not get better 
this trip. I got off the boat in St. Paul because I 
had lost my nerve, did not have any confidence in 
my ability to handle (drive) the boat. 
It seems like that I am deeper in this black hole, 
and no hope of ever coming out. And I just can't 
take it. If there was a way that I change things + 
make them better I would beleive [sic] me. 
Please give or see that Teresa + Keith get 
$25,000 a piece of my savings + investments I 
have always wanted them to have something 
when my life was over. Jane I love you so much + 
really am sorry I know of no other way. 
You and all remember my better years. I know 
that no one can understand this I don't myself, but 
it is bigger than me. 
Bye Bye To All 
And Please Forgive me 
(s) W.O. Mclntyre 
After reading the notes, Browder acknowledged 
that Mclntyre's personality had changed in the last 
six months of his life, and that he was less active 
and spent less time with his grandson, Clay. 
However, he did not believe that his uncle was 
mentally ill. 
At the conclusion of Browder's testimony, the 
Proponents moved the court to find that due 
execution of the will had been proven, and that, 
consequently, the burden of proof shifted to 
Contestants to show that Mclntyre lacked 
testamentary capacity when he executed the will. 
The Contestants argued that the burden to prove 
testamentary capacity remained on the will's 
Proponents because of "suspicious circumstances" 
surrounding the execution of the will, namely that it 
consisted solely of the testator's suicide notes. The 
trial court ruled that the Proponents had satisfied 
their burden of proving due execution of the will, 
and that the burden then shifted to the children to 
show that their father lacked testamentary capacity 
at the time he executed the will. 
*5 The Contestants then presented testimony 
regarding Mclntyre's testamentary capacity. 
Mclntyre's grown children, Teresa Burns and 
Keith Mclntyre, indicated that Mclntyre had been 
a vibrant, energetic man, but that his personality 
dramatically changed in the six months prior to his 
death. Teresa testified that, in the six months prior 
to his suicide, Mclntyre was frequently unclean, 
unshaven and sloppily dressed, and that she often 
found him asleep in the middle of the day. Referring 
to Mclntyre's hospitalization for depression, 
Teresa testified that her father probably tried to 
"fake his way out" by pretending his mental state 
had improved. Keith testified that, after Mclntyre 
was released from the hospital, he was 
uncharacteristically emotional and physically 
affectionate. Both Teresa and Keith acknowledged 
that Mclntyre continued to appear aware of what 
he owned and continued to know close family 
members and friends. Keith acknowledged that his 
father and stepmother had a good relationship. 
However, Teresa maintained that Mclntyre was not 
of sound mind when he wrote the suicide notes that 
served as his will. 
Linda Laney testified about her counseling with 
Mclntyre. She said that she saw Mclntyre twice, 
several days before he was hospitalized. She 
testified that, although Mclntyre was "deeply 
depressed," he was oriented as to time and place, 
recognized Laney, and knew who his wife, children 
and other family members were. 
Paul King, M.D. ("Dr.King") testified by 
deposition that he treated Mclntyre during his 
hospitalization. He diagnosed Mclntyre as 
suffering from "major depression without psychotic 
features." Dr. King said that Mclntyre's belief that 
his diabetes was "terrible" was an "irrational 
feeling" but not a delusion. He testified that the 
suicide notes were the result of Mclntyre's 
"irrational feelings" about his diabetes, combined 
with "rational thinking" about his family and the 
manner in which he wanted his estate divided. Dr. 
King stated that Mclntyre remained oriented as to 
time, place and person, did not become out of touch 
with reality, and showed no signs of being psychotic. 
Another psychiatrist, Catherine Morton Greene, 
M.D. ("Dr.Greene") testified about Mclntyre's 
mental state after reviewing his medical records, 
Linda Laney's records, and the suicide notes. Dr. 
Greene felt that Mclntyre was having "irrational 
thoughts and feelings" when he wrote the suicide 
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notes Dr Greene said that Mclntyre's feelings of 
hopelessness about his rather mild case of diabetes 
demonstrated that he was, to a degree, "out of touch 
with reality " She opined that the fact that Mclntyre 
committed suicide demonstrated that he was not 
thinking rationally 
After deliberation, the jury found that Mclntyre 
had been of sound and disposing mind and had 
sufficient mental capacity to make the will 
Consequently, on March 30, 1998, the trial court 
entered an order finding that the holographic will 
"was valid in all respects," and confirming its 
previous probate In response, Contestants filed a 
motion for a new trial The trial court denied the 
motion on June 30, 1998 The Contestants now 
appeal the decision of the trial court 
*6 On appeal, the Contestants argue that the trial 
court erred m refusing to place the burden of 
proving testamentary capacity on the will's 
Proponents, due to the "suspicious circumstances" 
surrounding the death of the decedent They 
contend there was no material evidence supporting 
the jury's verdict that the decedent possessed a 
sound and disposmg mmd at the time he executed 
the will The Contestants also argue that the trial 
court erred in its jury instructions, m permitting the 
Proponents' expert witness to testify about the 
decedent's capacity to make a will, m permitting the 
Proponents' expert witness to offer opmions not 
rendered to any degree of medical certainty, in 
allowing a letter from the Proponents' expert to be 
admitted mto evidence, m refusing to allow the jury 
access to trial exhibits, and m permitting the 
Proponents to ask leadmg questions of their witness 
The Contestants first argue that the trial court erred 
by ruling that the burden was upon the Contestants 
to prove that Mclntyre lacked testamentary 
capacity They assert that Mclntyre's will is 
suspect because it consists of suicide notes written 
while in a deep depression and under the influence 
of a delusional belief about his diabetes They argue 
that these facts amount to "suspicious 
circumstances" surrounding the execution of 
Mclntyre's will, and that consequently the burden 
to prove testamentary capacity remamed on the 
will's proponents 
The trial court's ruling on the burden of proof in a 
will contest case is a conclusion of law, which we 
review de novo, with no presumption of correctness 
attached to the trial court's conclusion of law See 
Union Carbide Corp v Huddleston, 854 S W 2d 
87, 91 (Term 1993), Zseltvay \ Metropolitan Gov't 
of Nashville and Davidson County, 986 S W 2d 
581, 584 (Term Ct App 1998) A holographic will is 
one that is written m the testator's own hand To be 
prima facie \alid, "the signature and all its material 
provisions must be in the handwriting of the testator 
and his handwritmg must be proved by two (2) 
witnesses" lennCode Ann § 32-1-105 (1984) In 
this case, the testimony was undisputed that the 
suicide notes were entirely m the handwritmg of 
Mclntyre and were signed by him 
Ordinarily, once due execution of a will has been 
proven, the burden shifts to the will's contestants to 
prove that the will is invalid due to fraud, lack of 
testamentary capacity, or undue influence This 
Court has stated 
In a will contest the initial burden is upon the 
proponent of the will to show its prima facie 
validity and this is a question for the 
determination of the court Upon the proponent's 
satisfactorily showmg prima facie validity, the 
burden shifts to the contestant and, generally, the 
burden is upon the contestant to show facts relied 
upon to void the will 
Taliaferro \ Green, 622 SW2d 829, 835 
(TennCt App 1981), overruled on other grounds 
by Matlock v Simpson, 902 SW2d 384, 386 
(Tenn 1995) See also Harper v Watkins, 670 
SW2d 611, 628 (TennCtApp 1983) A testator is 
presumed to have the capacity to execute a will 
Taliaferro, 622 SW2d at 835 If the testator has 
previously been adjudicated insane, the burden to 
show testamentary capacity fall upon the will's 
proponents, m all other cases, the burden shifts to 
the will's contestants to show that the testator lacked 
testamentary capacity Harper, 670 S W 2d at 628 
(quoting Par ham v Walker, 568 SW2d 622, 624 
(TennCt App 1978)) 
*7 However, where "suspicious circumstances" are 
shown to have surrounded the execution of the will, 
that is, circumstances which raise doubts as to 
whether the lestator understood the significance of 
his actions, the proponents have the burden of 
commg forward with evidence that the testator had 
the capacity to execute the will 
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The rules of burden of proof with regard to 
testamentary capacity are substantially similar to 
those with regard to undue influence. Ordinarily, 
there exists a presumption of testamentary 
capacity once the prima facie validity of the will 
is shown, but the existence of suspicious 
circumstances, once shown by the contestant, 
shifts the burden to the proponent to come 
forward with evidence that capacity existed, 
whereupon the issues go to the jury. 
Taliaferro, 622 S.W.2d at 837 (citations omitted). 
The burden to show the existence of suspicious 
circumstances is always on the contestant in a will 
contest case. Keasler v. Estate of Keasler, 973 
S.W.2d213, 217 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997). 
In this case, Contestants argue that Mclntyre's 
delusional belief about the severity of his diabetes, 
the resulting suicide, and the fact that his will 
consists of suicide notes, amounted to suspicious 
circumstances which placed the burden upon 
Proponents to produce evidence of Mclntyre's 
capacity. In support of their argument, Contestants 
rely on Goodall v. Crawford, 611 S.W.2d 602 
(Tenn.Ct .App.1980) and Burrow v. Lewis, 142 
S.W.2d758 (Tenn.Ct.App.1940). 
In Goodall, the testator was an eighty-two year old 
man who had suffered a stroke which caused a 
degree of memory loss. The testator executed three 
different, mutually exclusive wills in a period of 
less than five years. Goodall, 611 S.W.2d at 602. 
The last will favored the son and daughter-in-law 
with whom the testator was living at that time. 
Under the last will, nothing was left to the testator's 
other children. Shortly after executing the will, the 
testator suffered another stroke and died. The 
children who had been excluded from the will filed 
a will contest lawsuit against the beneficiaries under 
the last will, arguing that their father lacked 
testamentary capacity and that the will was the 
product of undue influence. The jury found the will 
to be valid. On appeal, the contestants argued that 
the trial court had erroneously charged the jury on 
the burden of proof regarding undue influence and 
testamentary capacity. Id. at 604. The contestants 
argued that "under the circumstances of this case, 
the burden should have remained on the proponents 
to show that the testator had the requisite mental 
capacity and was free of undue influence when he 
executed his will." Id. The Court in Goodall, 
quoting Burrow v. Lewis, 142 S.W.2d 758 
(Tenn.Ct.App. 1940), discussed the burden of proof 
in a will contest case: 
The issue here is between the general rule and an 
exception. The rule and the exception were 
discussed in Burrow v. Lewis, 24 Tenn.App. 253, 
142 S.W.2d 758 (1940): 
*8 "Ordinarily, upon proof of the due execution 
of the will, it will be presumed that the testator 
knew and approved its contents; but where the 
circumstances are such as to excite suspicion, the 
burden of showing affirmatively that the testator 
fully understood and freely assented to its 
provisions is cast upon the proponents." 24 
Tenn.App. at 259, 142 S.W.2d758. 
In Burrow v. Lewis, the suspicious circumstances 
were these: A ninety year old blind man on his 
deathbed executed his will by making a mark 
which was out of the ordinary for him; an hour 
before he executed the will he failed to recognize 
his confidential business agent; the chief 
beneficiary under the will who had been acting as 
his nurse for two weeks arranged for the drafting 
of the will and assisted with the manual execution 
of the paper. 
Id. at 604. The Court found that there were not 
sufficient suspicious circumstances in Goodall to 
warrant placing the burden to prove testamentary 
capacity and lack of undue influence on the will's 
proponents. Id. 
In Burrow v. Lewis, the Court discussed examples 
of situations in which suspicious circumstances 
were found to exist, such as where: 
the testator is aged, sick and infirm or unable to 
read and write by reason of blindness or 
illiteracy. In such cases it is held that proponent is 
onerated with the burden of showing that the 
testator comprehended the fact that he was about 
to execute his will and understood the contents of 
the paper. None of them hold that the burden of 
proving testamentary capacity rests upon 
proponent at any time or under any 
circumstances. Except when insanity is shown to 
have existed prior to the execution of the will this 
burden rests throughout the trial upon the 
contestant The better practice is undoubtedly 
to maintain a clear distinction between the burden 
of proof upon the legal execution of the will in 
cases where, by reason of the peculiar facts 
appearing, the burden of showing a conscious 
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execution of the will free from suspicious 
circumstances is placed upon the proponent and 
the general burden of establishing insanity and 
undue influence which, as we have seen, 
contmues throughout the trial to rest upon 
contestants 
Id at 763-64 
In Curry v Bridges 325 SW2d 87 
(TennCtApp 1959), the testator committed suicide 
shortly after execution of the will, and was found to 
have testamentary capacity In Curry the testator 
executed a will m which he established a trust in 
favor of Union University m Jackson, Tennessee 
Forty-seven days later, he committed suicide by 
tightly sealing himself into a hand-made box m 
which he had rigged fire extinguishers to slowly 
release carbon dioxide gas In the will contest case 
filed by the testator's relatives, the trial court 
granted a directed verdict to the will's proponents 
This decision was appealed After considermg the 
circumstances, the Court of Appeals found that the 
testator "was fully capacitated at the time he made 
his will to understand what he was domg, to whom 
he wanted bequests and devises made, and the way 
and manner m which he wanted the trust 
administered "Id at 111 It concluded that "the 
deliberation with which he went about the 
preparation of the way that he would take his life 
makes it clear and unmistakable that he knew the 
result of his act and knew what he wanted to do," 
and that "he died just like he wanted to die, aloof 
and alone" Id Thus Mclntyre's suicide, m and of 
itself, does not necessarily demonstrate lack of 
testamentary capacity See id See also In re Estate 
ofBonjean 413 N E 2 d 205, 208 (111 App Ct 1980) 
("The act of suicide, or attempted suicide, is not, 
per se, proof of insanity or msane delusions") 
*9 The Contestants contend, however, that even if 
Mclntyre was generally competent, he suffered 
from an "msane delusion" regarding the severity of 
his diabetes, and that this delusion motivated his 
suicide and the creation of his will A person is said 
to suffer from an msane delusion " 'when he 
conceives somethmg extravagant or unreasonable to 
exist which has no existence except m his own 
abnormal imagination, but having once conceived 
the thmg or conditioned [sic] to exist, it is 
impossible to reason him out of it' " Helm v Hayes 
No 03A01-9710-PB-00497, 1998 WL 251766, at * 
1 (Tenn CtApp May 19, 1998) (quotmg Melody v 
Hamblin 115 SW2d 237 (TennCt App 1937)) 
See also In re Estate of Breeden 992 P 2d 1167, 
1170 (Colo 2000) (defining insane delusion as " 
'persistent belief m that which has no existence m 
fact, and which is adhered to agamst all the 
evidence' ") (quotmg In re Cole's Estate 226 P 143, 
145 (Colo 19 24)), In re Estate of Diaz 524 SE2d 
219, 221 (Ga 1999) (msane delusion is "a delusion 
havmg no foundation m fact and that sprmgs from a 
diseased condition of mind"), In re Estate of Weil, 
518 P2d 995, 999 (Ariz CtApp 1974) (msane 
delusion is " 'the conception of a disordered mind 
which imagines facts to exist of which there is no 
evidence and the belief m which is adhered to 
agamst all evidence and argument to the contrary' ") 
(quoting Estate of Cook, 159 P 2d 797, 802 
(Ariz 1945)) The will of a testator found to suffer 
from an msane delusion will not be held invalid, 
however, unless it is shown that his delusion 
materially afiected the terms and provisions of his 
will Estate of Breeden 992 P 2d at 1171, Estate of 
Weil 518P2ia t999 
At trial, both psychiatrists agreed that Mclntyre's 
persistent belief about the severity of his diabetes 
was "irrational", one labeled it a delusion, the other 
would not Eegardless, there was no evidence that 
Mclntyre1 s belief about his diabetes materially 
affected the terms of his will Rather, the 
contestants argue that it motivated the creation of 
the will Under these circumstances, we find no 
error m the tiial court's refusal to shift the burden of 
showmg testamentary capacity from the will's 
Contestants to the Proponents 
The Contestants also argue that there was no 
material evidence to support the verdict of the jury 
They assert lhat no reasonable jury could conclude 
that Mclntyre was of sound mind at the time that 
he wrote the >uicide notes 
Our review of this issue is governed by Tennessee 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(d), which states 
that "finding:* of fact by a jury in civil actions shall 
be set aside only if there is no material evidence to 
support the verdict" This is a highly deferential 
standard of review, requiring us "to take the 
strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of 
the verdict, assume the truth of the evidence m 
support thereof, allow all reasonable mferences to 
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sustain the verdict and disregard all to the contrary " 
Johnson v Car gill Inc, 984 SW2d 233, 234 
(Tenn Ct App 1998) (citmg Hobson v First State 
Bank 777 S W2d 24 (Tenn Ct App 1989)) If there 
is any material evidence to support the jury's finding 
that Mclntyre was of sound and disposmg mmd 
and memory at the time that he executed his will, 
the finding will not be disturbed on appeal See 
Bruster v Ethendge, 345 SW2d 692, 697 
(Tenn Ct App 1960) 
*10 A testator is deemed to have testamentary 
capacity if, at the time that he executes his will, he 
is able to know and understand the significance of 
his action In re Estate of El am, 738 SW2d 169, 
171 (Tenn 1987), Keasler v Estate of Keasler, 973 
S W2d 213, 219 (TennCt App 1997), Harper v 
Wathns, 670 S W2d 611, 628 (TennCt App 1983) 
Generally, all that is required to show testamentary 
capacity is that the testator was aware of the 
property which he was disposmg of and the manner 
m which it would be distributed, knew the natural 
objects of his bounty, and understood the 
significance of his disposition Melody v Hambhn, 
115 SW2d 237, 242 (Tenn Ct App 1937) "The 
testator must have an mtelhgent consciousness of 
the nature and effect of the act, a knowledge of the 
property possessed and an understanding of the 
disposition to be made" Estate of Elam, 738 
SW2d at 171 (citation omitted) A strong 
presumption exists that the testator possessed the 
requisite capacity to know and understand his 
actions at the time he executed his will "Inquiry 
must center on the decedent's mental condition at 
the time of execution of the will, and a contestant 
must introduce strong evidence to establish a lack 
of testamentary capacity at the time of the execution 
of the will" Keasler, 973 S W 2d at 217 
In this case, even those witnesses who expressed 
the belief that Mclntyre had not been of sound 
mmd at the time he wrote the suicide notes 
acknowledged that Mclntyre always knew his 
family In the notes, Mclntyre listed his various 
accounts m detail, by name, account number, and 
latest account balance He gave Mrs Mclntyre 
detailed instructions on the location of his savmgs 
bonds and the office of a person with whom he had 
placed some investments Virtually every close 
family member and friend was mentioned by name 
Moreover, he explamed the reason for leavmg the 
bulk of his estate to his wife, writing that she had 
been "a dear and understanding partner m life," and 
she was the one who would be "affected and hurt 
the most" and would "need it all" "While proof of 
the reason for making a disposition is not necessary, 
it is nevertheless relevant to show the testator knew 
the force and consequences of his act" Estate oj 
Elam, 738 SW2d at 172 Clearly there was 
substantial evidence that Mclntyre was aware of 
the property of which he was disposing and the 
manner m which it would be distributed, the natural 
objects of his bounty, that he understood the nature 
and effect of his act See Melody v Hambhn, 115 
S W 2d at 242, Estate of Elam, 738 S W 2d at 171 
The Contestants also argue that the trial court erred 
in its jury instructions The Contestants sought a 
specific instruction on suicide which stated that "a 
person's will is not valid where he makes it m 
contemplation of suicide, and under the influence of 
morbid and unhappy feelmgs which m fact lead to 
his suicide, if those morbid and unhappy feelmgs 
deprive him of testamentary capacity" They 
mamtam that the trial court erred m refusing to give 
this instruction 
*11 The trial court is afforded discretion m the 
substance of its jury instructions, so long as the 
instructions given are substantially accurate 
concerning the applicable law Mitchell v Smith, 
779 S W2d 384, 390 (TennCt App 1989) The trial 
court need not give a specific instruction, the 
substance of which is covered m the general charge 
given to the jury Id In this case, the trial court 
instructed the jury that it should consider "matters 
that show the person's mental condition at the time 
the will was made," and that it could consider the 
"person's appearance, conduct, declarations, 
conversations and all other evidence of that person's 
mental condition, both before and after the will was 
made" We find that this jury instruction was 
sufficient, and that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion m denymg the Contestants' requested 
instruction on suicide 
The Contestants also contend that the trial court 
erred m permitting the Proponents' expert witness, 
Dr Paul Kmg, to testify that the testator had 
testamentary capacity, and m allowing him to offer 
opmions which were not rendered to any degree of 
medical certainty In this case, Dr Kmg testified as 
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a treating physician and as an expert witness. He 
testified that Mclntyre exhibited no signs of 
psychosis, and was always oriented as to person, 
place and time. His opinion as to Mclntyre's 
mental state was based on his evaluation and 
treatment of Mclntyre as a patient. Moreover, 
under Rule 704 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence 
: "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference 
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact." Under these circumstances, we find no 
error in the admission of Dr. King's testimony. 
Finally, the Contestants argue that the trial court 
erred by permitting the Proponents to ask leading 
questions of a witness, by allowing a letter from the 
Proponents' expert to be read at trial, and by 
refusing to allow the jury access to certain exhibits. 
All of these issues involve evidentiary matters, over 
which the trial court has broad discretion. Davis v. 
Hall 920 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1995) 
(citing Otis v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 850 
S.W.2d 439, 442 (Term. 1992));. Castelli v. Lien, 
910 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995). We find 
no reversible error in the trial court's decisions on 
these issues. 
The decision of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are 
assessed against the Appellants, Teresa Burns and 
Stacey Keith Mclntyre, and their surety for which 
execution may issue, if necessary. 
2000 WL 33191354 (Tenn.CtApp.) 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 58. OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
CHAPTER 9. FUNERAL SERVICES LICENSING ACT 
PART 6. CONTROL OF DISPOSITION 
58-9-602 Determination of control of disposition. 
The right and duty to control the disposition of a deceased person, including the 
location and conditions of the disposition, vest m the following degrees of 
relationship in the order named: 
(1) a person designated m a written instrument, excluding a power of attorney 
that terminates at death under Sections 75-5-501 and 75-5-502, if the written 
instrument contains: 
(a) the name and address of the decedent; 
(b) the name and address of the person designated under this Subsection 
(l); 
(c) the signature of the decedent; 
(d) the signatures of at least two unrelated individuals who are not the 
person designated under this Subsection (1) , each of whom signed within a 
reasonable time after witnessing the signing of the form by the decedent; 
and 
(e) the date or dates the written instrument was prepared and signed; 
(2) the surviving, legally recognized spouse of the decedent; 
(3) the surviving child or the majority of the surviving children of the 
decedent over the age of 18; 
(4) the unanimous consent of the surviving parent, parents, or lawful 
custodian of the decedent, 
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(5) the person or persons m the next degree of succession under Title 75, 
Chapter 2, Intestate Succession and Wills; 
(6) any public official charged with arranging the disposition of deceased 
persons; 
(7) a person or persons whom the funeral service director reasonably believes 
is entitled to control the disposition; and 
(8) m the absence of any person under Subsections (1) through (7), any person 
willing to assume the right and duty to control the disposition. 
History: C. 1953, 58-9-602, enacted by L. 2003, ch. 49, § 21. 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Effective Dates. —Laws 2003, ch. 49 became effective on May 5, 2003, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-9-602, UT ST § 58-9-602 
Statutes current through 2003 2nd Special Session. Annotations current through 
UT 51 (11/14/2003), 2003 Utah APP 389 (11/14/2003 and November 14, 2003 
(Federal Cases). 
Copyright © 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
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C 
WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VII. JUDGMENT 
Copr. © West, a Thomson business 2004. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 2-01-04 
RULE 63. DISABILITY OR DISQUALIFICATION OF A JUDGE 
(a) Substitute judge; Prior testimony. If the judge to whom an action has been assigned is unable to perform the 
duties required of the court under these rules, then any other judge of that district or any judge assigned pursuant to 
Judicial Council rule is authorized to perform those duties. The judge to whom the case is assigned may in the 
exercise of discretion rehear the evidence or some part of it. 
(b) Disqualification. 
(1)(A) A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to disqualify a judge. The motion shall be 
accompanied by a certificate that the motion is filed in good faith and shall be supported by an affidavit stating 
facts sufficient to show bias, prejudice or conflict of interest. 
(B) The motion shall be filed after commencement of the action, but not later than 20 days after the last of the 
following: 
(i) assignment of the action or hearing to the judge; 
(ii) appearance of the party or the party's attorney; or 
(iii) the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of 
the grounds upon which the motion is based. 
If the last event occurs fewer than 20 days prior to a hearing, the motion shall be filed as soon as practicable. 
(C) Signing the motion or affidavit constitutes a certificate under Rule 11 and subjects the party or attorney to 
the procedures and sanctions of Rule 11. No party may file more than one motion to disqualify in an action. 
(2) The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall, without further hearing, enter an order 
granting the motion or certifying the motion and affidavit to a reviewing judge. If the judge grants the motion, the 
order shall direct the presiding judge of the court or, if the court has no presiding judge, the presiding officer of the 
Judicial Council to assign another judge to the action or hearing. The presiding judge of the court, any judge of the 
district, any judge of a court of like jurisdiction, or the presiding officer of the Judicial Council may serve as the 
reviewing judge. 
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(3)(A) If the reviewing judge finds that the motion and affidavit are timely filed, filed in good faith and legally 
sufficient, the reviewing judge shall assign another judge to the action or hearing or request the presiding judge or 
the presiding officer of the Judicial Council to do so. 
(B) In determining issues of fact or of law, the reviewing judge may consider any part of the record of the action 
and may request of the judge who is the subject of the motion and affidcivit an affidavit responsive to questions 
posed by the reviewing judge. 
(C) The reviewing judge may deny a motion not filed in a timely manner. 
[Amended effective November 1, 1999/ 
Rules Civ. Proa, Rule 63 
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RULE 65A INJUNCTIONS 
(a) Preliminary Injunctions. 
(1) Notice No prelimmary injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party 
(2) Consolidation of Hearing Before or after the commencement of the hearmg of an application for a 
prelimmary injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated 
with the hearmg of the application Even when this consolidation is not ordered, any evidence received upon an 
application for a preliminary injunction which would be admissible at the trial on the merits becomes part of the 
trial record and need not be repeated at the trial This subdivision (a)(2) shall be so construed and applied as to 
save to the parties any rights they may have to trial by jury 
(b) Temporary Restraining Orders. 
(1) Notice No temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the adverse party or that party's 
attorney unless (A) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that 
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or that party's 
attorney can be heard in opposition, and (B) the applicant or the applicant's attorney certifies to the court m wntmg 
as to the efforts, if any, that have been made to give notice and the reasons supporting the claim that notice should 
not be required 
(2) Form of Order Every temporary restraining order shall be endorsed with the date and hour of issuance and 
shall be filed forthwith m the clerk's office and entered of record The order shall define the injury and state why it 
is irreparable The order shall expire by its terms withm such time after entry, not to exceed ten days, as the court 
fixes, unless withm the time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended for a like period or unless the 
party agamst whom the order is directed consents that it may be extended for a longer period The reasons for the 
extension shall be entered of record 
(3) Priority of Hearing If a temporary restraining order is granted, the motion for a prelimmary injunction shall 
be scheduled for hearmg at the earliest possible time and takes precedence over all other civil matters except older 
matters of the same character When the motion comes on for hearmg, the party who obtained the temporary 
restraining order shall have the burden to show entitlement to a prelimmary injunction, if the party does not do so, 
the court shall dissolve the temporary restraining order 
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(4) Dissolution or Modification. On two days' notice to the party who obtained the temporary restraining order 
without notice, or on such shorter notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may appear and 
move its dissolution or modification. In that event the court shall proceed to hear and determine the motion as 
expeditiously as the ends of justice require. 
(c) Security. 
(1) Requirement The court shall condition issuance of the order or injunction on the giving of security by the 
applicant, in such sum and form as the court deems proper, unless it appears that none of the parties will incur or 
suffer costs, attorney fees or damage as the result of any wrongful order or injunction, or unless there exists some 
other substantial reason for dispensing with the requirement of security. No such security shall be required of the 
United States, the State of Utah, or of an officer, agency, or subdivision of either; nor shall it be required when it is 
prohibited by law. 
(2) Amount Not a Limitation. The amount of security shall not establish or limit the amount of costs, including 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with the restraining order or preliminary injunction, or damages 
that may be awarded to a party who is found to have been wrongfully restrained or enjoined. 
(3) Jurisdiction Over Surety A surety upon a bond or undertaking under this rule submits to the jurisdiction of 
the court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of the court as agent upon whom any papers affecting the surety's 
liability on the bond or undertaking may be served. The surety's liability may be enforced on motion without the 
necessity of an independent action. The motion and such notice of the motion as the court prescribes may be 
served on the clerk of the court who shall forthwith mail copies to the persons giving the security if their addresses 
are known. 
(d) Form and Scope. Every restraining order and order granting an injunction shall set forth the reasons for its 
issuance. It shall be specific in terms and shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint 
or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained. It shall be binding only upon the parties to the action, 
their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation 
with them who receive notice, in person or through counsel, or otherwise, of the order. If a restraining order is 
granted without notice to the party restrained, it shall state the reasons justifying the court's decision to proceed 
without notice. 
(e) Grounds. A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only upon a showing by the applicant that: 
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction issues; 
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the proposed order or injunction may cause 
the party restrained or enjoined; 
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the 
case presents serious issues on the merits which should be the subject of further litigation. 
(f) Domestic Relations Cases. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the equitable powers of the courts 
in domestic relations cases. 
Advisory Committee Note 
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Rule 65A has been materially revised from the former rule Some of the changes m the rule are the result of 
suggestions from Utah's judges, all of whom were asked for their comments on specific ways to improve mjunction 
practice Although most paragraphs have been changed, there are two major revisions First, under paragraph (b) 
of the present rule, the court now has explicit authority to order the consolidation of trial on the merits with the 
hearmg on a prelimmary mjunction Second, the grounds for the issuance of temporary restrammg orders and 
prelimmary injunctions have been modernized and clarified m paragraph (e) Portions of the rule have been 
reorganized for purposes of clarity 
Paragraph (a). Subparagraph (a)(1) is identical to paragraph (a) of the former rule It is also identical to the 
corresponding subparagraph m Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Subparagraph (a)(2) is entirely new to 
the Utah rules It is borrowed from subparagraph (a)(2) of the federal rule It allows the court, m its discretion, to 
adjudicate the entire case at the time of the prelimmary mjunction hearmg If the court decides not to consolidate 
the trial on the merits with the preliminary injunction hearmg, admissible evidence received at the prelimmary 
mjunction hearmg nevertheless becomes part of the trial record and need not be introduced again 
Paragraph (b). This paragraph is similar to paragraph (b) of the former rule It has been reorganized for clarity 
and has been modernized m other respects Subparagraph (1) prohibits the issuance of a temporary restrammg 
order unless two conditions are met First, as in the former rule, the record must disclose that irreparable injury, 
loss, or damage will result if the court does not mtervene Second, the applicant or the applicant's attorney must 
provide written certification of any effort to give notice and the reasons for which notice should not be required 
The latter requirement is new The language m subparagraphs (3) and (4) has been modernized and clarified 
Paragraph (c). This paragraph has been revised to reflect developments m the case law and a new rule in this 
state on damages for wrongfully issued injunctions Subparagraph (1) makes it clear that the court may declme to 
require security if it appears that none of the parties will suffer expense or damages from a wrongful temporary 
restrammg order or prelimmary mjunction, or if, m the particular case, there is some other substantial reason for 
dispensing with the requirement of security See Corporation of President of Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day 
Saints v Wallace, 573 P2d 1285, 1286-87 (Utah 1978) Otherwise, the court should require security m an 
appropriate amount Subparagraph (2), which is new, makes it clear that the amount of the security required by the 
court does not limit the recovery that may be awarded to a wrongfully restrained party This provision represents a 
change m Utah law Compare with Mountain States Tel & Tel Co v Atkin Wright & Mills, 681 P 2d 1258 (Utah 
1984) In the committee's view, the prior rule was unfair to the wrongfully enjomed party whose damages from the 
mjunction may far exceed the amount of security estimated at the outset of the case Subparagraph (2) also 
explicitly allows a wrongfully enjomed party to recover attorney fees Subparagraph (3) is closely similar to 
language m a portion of the former rule's paragraph (c) 
Paragraph (d). This paragraph is similar to the corresponding paragraph m the former rule Borrowing a 
concept from paragraph (b) of the former rule, it requires the court to state its reasons for grantmg a temporary 
restrammg order without notice 
Paragraph (e). This paragraph completely revises the corresponding paragraph of the former rule The 
committee sought to modernize the grounds for the issuance of injunctive orders by incorporating standards 
consistent with national trends There is little case law in Utah interpreting the grounds for injunctive orders, and 
the committee was divided as to whether the development of grounds should be left entirely to the courts A 
majority of the committee believed, however, that courts and litigants would benefit from explicit standards drawn 
from sound authority The standards set forth m paragraph (e) are derived from Tn-State Generation & 
Transmission Ass'n v Shoshone River Power Inc 805 F 2d 351, 355 (10th Cir 1986), and Otero Savings & Loan 
Ass'n v Federal Reserve Bank, 665 F 2d 275, 278 (10th Cir 1981) Federal courts require proof of compliance 
with each of the four standards, but the weight given to each standard may vary The substantial body of federal 
case authority m this area should assist the Utah courts m developmg the law under paragraph (e) 
Paragraph (f). This paragraph is new It acknowledges that m domestic relations cases courts must 
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occasionally enter prohibitory or mandatory orders under circumstances that do not permit compliance with the 
procedures in Rule 65A. The committee believed that this rule should not be construed to limit the authority of the 
court in domestic relations cases. 
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1159 OPEEATION OF THE COURTS Rule 4-504 
separate, written motion to strike, the plaintiff Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917 (Utah Ct. App. 
should have been given ten days to respond, as 1994). 
prescribed by Subdivision (l)(b) of this rule. 
Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 P.2d 1205 (Utah Ct. ' Cited in Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 (Utah 
App. 1991). ' • 1991); Lucero y. Warden of Utah State Prison, 
Even though the trial court had considered 841 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Wright v. 
both parties' motions and memoranda for and University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 
against the award of attorney fees, it erred in 1994); Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.^922 P.2d 
entering its decision before the time allowed 745 (Utah 1996); Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 
under this rule to file a reply memorandum had 2002 UT 38, 48 P3d 895; Lovendahl v. Jordan 
expired and in not reconsidering its decision by Sch. Dist., 2002 UT 130, 463 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, . 
reviewing plaintiffs' reply memorandum and — P.3d —. 
revised affidavits. American Vending Servs., 
Rule 4-502. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Rule 4-502, establishing a pro- 1999. For comparable provisions, see Rule 26, 
cedure for the filing of discovery documents in U.R.C.P. 
civil cases, was repealed effective November 1, 
Rule 4-503. Requests for j u ry ins t ruct ions . 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting and requesting jury instruc-
.tions. • 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District and Justice Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) All jury instruction requests shall be presented to the court five days 
prior to the scheduled trial date unless otherwise ordered by the court. The 
court, in its discretion, may allow the presentation of jury instructions at any 
time prior to the submission of the case to the jury. At the time of presentation 
to the court, a copy of the reauested instructions shall be furnished to opposing 
counsel. 
(2) Ju ry instruction requests must be in writing and state in full the 
instruction requested. Each request shall be upon a separate - sheet of paper, 
the original and copies of which shall be free-from red lines and firm names and 
shall be entitled: 
"Instruction No " 
The number of the request shall be writ ten in lead pencil. 
(3) If case citations are used in support of a requested instruction, at least 
lone copy of the requested instruction furnished to the court shall be submitted 
^without the citations. Citations may be provided upon separate sheets at-
| tached to the particular instruction to which the citation applies. 
^Amended effective January 15, 1990; November 1, 1996.) 
IRule 4-504. Written orders, j udgments and decrees . 
gjntent: 
|g|;.Tb establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments, 
i | | i d decrees to the court. This rule is not intended to change existing law with 
|gespect to the enforceability of unwri t ten agreements. 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y : 
fep?his rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of record except small |p|dms. . 
| | | t a t e m e n t of the Rule: 
fi|l(l) In all rulings by a court, "counsel for the par ty or parties obtaining the 
llpilihg shall within fifteen days,, or TOthin a .shorter t ime as the court .may 
^^rect," file "with th£' court a'pYpposed^; .order, judgment , 1 ^ ; decree in conformity. 
l l K h the /ruling".-
JXUle 4-DUD ItU-Lili^ UJ? dUUL^uu^i\±j±vi±ri±OLiitiJ.i\jL\ 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, ji. dgments, and orders shall be se 
upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature irr21 
the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to thedKT 
and counsel within five days after service. 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writ 
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen days of the settlem^ 
and dismissal. 
(4) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a maru2g|| 
as to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, I S l l 
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify tlief 
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order as | 
decree is made. 
(5) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall cor^ 
tain, if known, the judgment debtor's address or last known address and social:, 
security number. 
(6) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents am^ 
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by thff 
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the§ 
documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is basecp; 
(7) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipidation shall be signed,? 
or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of record*] 
for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was made! 
on the record. 
(8) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to paj* 
money and a judgment-has previously been rendered upon the same written] 
obligation, the plaintiff or plaihtifFs counsel shall ajtach to the new complaint] 
a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obligation. jS^ 
(9) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the power of any court| 
upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement agreement or any otherj 
agreement which has not been reduced to writing. 
(Amended effective January 15,1990; April 15,1991; April 15, 1995; November 
1, 1997.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Applicability Equip , Inc., 876 P2d 880 (Utah Ct App 1994f 
Oral settlement agreements 
Service of default judgment . S e r v i c e of de fau l t j u d g m e n t . 
Waiver of challenge. Plaintiffs' failure to mail a copy of the default 
d t e d . judgment to defendants did not invalidate the; 
default judgment when defendants received the; 
Applicability. notice of default in time to move to set aside t he 
The addition of Subdivision (10) (now Subdi- judgment Lincoln Benefit Life Ins . Co. v. BJF: 
vision (9)) indicates tha t this rule was never Southern Properties, 838 P 2 d 672 (Utah IS© 
intended to preempt the power of the court to App 1992) 
enforce sett lement agreements tha t meet com-
mon law requirements Goodmansen v Liberty Waiver of cha l l enge . 
Vending Sys , 866 P 2 d 581 (Utah Ct App By its failure to object to particular wording 
1993) m the court's final wri t ten order, defendant 
waived its right to challenge the order in that 
O r a l s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t s .
 r e g a r d o n a p p e a l E v a n s v S t a t e j 9 6 3 P 2 d p% 
This rule does not preclude a tr ial court from (Utah 1998) " »*• ^ 8 
enforcing an oral set t lement agreement, thus, a -^J 
Settlement agreement was enforceable despite C i t e d m DeBry v Fidelity NatT Title InS-
the fact t h a t it had not been reduced to wilting, Co , 828 P 2d 520 (Utah Ct App 1992), Reeves 
signed by the part ies, and entered on the mm- v Steinfeldt, 915 P 2 d 1073 (Utah Ct. ApF^ 
utes of the court John Deere Co v A&H 1996) 
Rule 4-505. At torney fees affidavits. 
Intent: _ 
To establish, uniform criteria and a uniform format for affidavits m suppP^ 
of attorney fees. 
